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THE SUPREME COURT'S ASSISTED SUICIDE OPINIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE:
AVOIDING A BUREAUCRACY OF DEATH
JAMES L. UNDERWOOD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Would permitting assisted suicide really vindicate the right of
private decision making when essential safeguards against abuse of the
practice would include complex procedures that often could involve
officials and other strangers in intimate end-of-life decisions?' Even
though the international controversy over assisted suicide has recently
intensified, this important issue has been strangely absent from the
discussion. However, recent developments demonstrate the importance
of this query and how its answer counsels against legislative or court
adoption of a right of assisted suicide.
In 1997, the international debate over whether or not the terminally
ill have a right to physician-assisted suicide erupted with a flurry of high
court and legislative actions. On June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that state prohibitions of assisted suicide, even for
the terminally ill, did not violate a fundamental liberty interest protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Nor did
such laws violate the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against
terminally ill persons who were not on life support by denying them
doctor aid in hastening death even though similarly ill patients on life
support could obtain physician assistance in stopping such treatment. 3
* Thurmond Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law; B.A., J.D., Emory
University; L.L.M., Yale University. The author would like to thank his research assistants Sabrina
Todd, Will Cook, and Aileen Clare, and the staff of the University of South Carolina School of Law
Word Processing Center, especially DeAnna Sugrue and Frances Molten. Thanks are also due to law
librarians Marsha Baum, Joseph Cross, Michael Brantley, Karen Taylor, and Steve Wang. The author
is grateful to W. Thomas Causby, attorney, for reading the manuscript and providing useful
suggestions.
1. Assisted suicide takes place when one person provides another with the means of ending his or
her life. See NEw YORK STATE TASK F ORCE ON L iFE AND THE L Aw, WHEN DEATH IS SouGI-r. AssISTED S Ui-
CIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 1 (1994). Euthanasia occurs when a person acts
directly to end another's life. Id. Euthanasia may be voluntary when performed upon a patient's
request, non-voluntary when performed without request, or involuntary when performed against a
patient's objection. Id.
2. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2261 (1997).
3. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2296 (1997). State courts have also been active recently in
rendering decisions against the proposed right of assisted suicide. Less than a month after the
decisions in Glucksberg and Vacco the Supreme Court of Florida decided Krischer v. Mclver, 697
So.2d 97 (Fla. 1997), in which it held that the state's prohibition on assisted suicide did not violate the
state constitutional right of privacy or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 104. The plaintiffs were a terminally ill, competent adult AIDS patient and his
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Congress and the President acted earlier in the spring of 1997 to ban the
use of federal money to pay for doctor-aided suicide. 4
Only five weeks prior to the Supreme Court's action, the Constitu-
tional Court of Colombia upheld voluntary euthanasia for the terminally
ill.5 In a statement to the press explaining the decision, the president of
the Court, Antonio Barrera, noted "'[a] humanitarian killing with the
previous consent of the patient can under certain circumstances be justi-
fied in cases of terminally-ill patients."' 6 Also in 1997, the Northern
Territory of Australia's attempt to introduce a complex system of
voluntary euthanasia was overridden by the national Senate. 7
Recent court decisions in two economically developed countries,
one in Europe and one in Asia, displayed a tolerance for assisted suicide
in certain circumstances. In 1994, the High Court of the Netherlands in
the notorious Opinion Chabot concluded that severe psychological
suffering in a patient who was not terminally ill could create an emer-
gency that justified a doctor in helping a patient to end her life. In such
a situation, the patient must request assistance in hastening death and the
physician. Id. at 99. The court concluded that the state had three compelling interests that justified
encroaching on the right of privacy: (I) preserving life; (2) preventing suicide; and (3) "maintaining
the integrity of the medical profession." Id. at 102-03. The state made a valid distinction between the
right to refuse medical treatment, which it permitted, and assisted suicide which it prohibited. Id. at
102. The former permitted a natural death but the latter was an "affirmative medical intervention that
[would] end . . . life on [the patient's] timetable and not in the natural course of events." Id. In his
dissent, Justice Kogan emphasized that the patient/plaintiff was in great pain and his death was near.
Id. at 109. Therefore he asked, "What possible interest does society have in saving life when there is
nothing of life to save but a final convulsion of agony?" Id. at I 1. See also Michigan v. Kevorkian,
527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not contain a fundamental right of assisted suicide). The Michigan court in Kevorkian observed that
recognition of the right of a competent person to halt life-maintaining medical treatment did not
require recognition of a right to assisted suicide since "suicide involves an affirmative act to end a life
[whereas] the refusal or cessation of life-sustaining medical treatment simply permits life to run its
course, unencumbered by contrived intervention." Id. at 728; see also Donaldson v. Van DeKamp, 4
Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that an individual's right of privacy could not be
expanded to protect another person who helped him end his life).
4. See Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction, Pub. L. No. 105-12, 111 Stat. 23 (1997) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 14401 - 14408 (1997)).
5. Complaint of Josd Euripides Parra Parra, Sentencia No. C-239/97, (Corte Constitucional, Mayo
20, 1997) (translations by Michael Mounter and Christina Jacuzzo; on file with the author at the
University of South Carolina Law School, Columbia, South Carolina).
6. Colombian Court Approves Limited Forms of Euthanasia, Reuters World Service, May 20,
1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS File. This statement led to a media duel with the
court's vice president, Eduardo Cifuentes, who contended that all that had been decided was that
doctors who prescribed pain relief medication that unexpectedly led to the patient's death would not
be criminally liable. See Colombia's High Court to Reconsider Approval of Euthanasia, Agence
France Presse, June 5, 1997, LEXIS, SAMER file. The controversy led the Court to reconsider and
reaffirm its decision. See Colombian Supreme Court Allows Euthanasia, Agence France Presse, June
13, 1997, LEXIS, SAMER file. A dissenting member of the Court, Jose Gregorio Hemandez, argued
that the decision was based on the "erroneous premise that each person is the owner of their own
life." Euthanasia Legalised, GUARDIAN, May 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS
File.
7. Euthanasia Laws Act 1997, No. 17 (1997) (Austl.) (superseding Northern Territory of Aus-
tralia, Rights of the Terminally Ill Act of 1995). The national legislature determined that the Northern
Territory should not have the authority to pass laws authorizing intentional killing.
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physician should adhere to an intricate set of guidelines, including
requirements that the patient be examined by independent doctors who
could verify her condition. 8
In 1995, a district court in Yokohama, Japan, gave a suspended
prison sentence to a doctor who had disconnected life support systems
and had given lethal injections to a bone cancer patient. 9 The court
described the situations in which termination of life supports, treatment
by potentially lethal drugs, and voluntary active euthanasia might be per-
mitted.10 To perform any of these acts, the patient had to be "in the last
stages of disease with no prospect of recovery.""l In addition, for active
euthanasia to be permissible, the "patient's own clearly expressed
consent" must be demonstrable along with proof that the patient is
"suffering physical pain that is difficult to bear," that death is "unavoid-
able" and "drawing near" and that "other methods of eliminating or
easing pain . . . have been exhausted."1 2 The act must be performed by
a physician. 13 The Japanese court's insistence that the patient be termi-
nally ill and experiencing unbearable physical suffering stands in sharp
contrast to the Dutch Opinion Chabot which concluded that severe
patient depression alone, unaccompanied by physical illness or unbear-
able bodily pain, could constitute an emergency justifying a doctor in
assisting in suicide and relieving that doctor from punishment if proper
procedures were followed.
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that not even a person
so sick with a final illness that she could not commit suicide on her own
8. Arrest-Chabot, HR (High Court of the Netherlands), 21 juni 1994, nr 96 972, 26, in NEDER-
LANDS JURISTENBLAD (NJB), juli 1994, at 893-95 [hereinafter Opinion Chabot]. A translation was
provided by Edward G. Kluiters, University of Leiden, the Netherlands (Masters, 1986); University of
South Carolina School of Law (J.D., 1988). Future citations of this case refer to the translated copy.
For another interpretation and translation of this case, see John Griffiths, Assisted Suicide in the
Netherlands: The Chabot Case, 58 MOD. L. REV. 232 (1995).
9. See Yomiuri Shimbun, Editorial, Euthanasia Ruling Should Be Praised, DAILY YOMIURI, Apr. 5,
1995, at 6. See also Robert B. Leflar, Informed Consent and Patients' Rights in Japan, 33 Hous. L.
REV. 1, 57-8 (1996) (describing the Judgment of Mar. 28, 1995, Yokohama District Court, 1530
HANREI JiHo 28 (the "Tokai University Hospital case")). The author is grateful to Professor Leflar for
supplying him with a copy of his translation of the case.
10. Leflar, supra note 9, at 58.
11. Id. at 58 n.253.
12. Id.
13. Id. See also criticism of the decision collected by Leflar. Id. at 58 n.256. For another de-
scription of the "Tokai University Hospital Case," see Alison C. Hall, Note, To Die With Dignity:
Comparing Physician Assisted Suicide in the United States, Japan and the Netherlands, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 803, 832-33 (1996). The note contends that "'Japan's main religions, Shinto and Buddhism, con-
sider suicide an acceptable solution to problems of suffering when faced with physical pain or
disease." Id. at 831 n.189. It is possible that this system of beliefs could have influenced the court to
conclude that active euthanasia could be performed in a narrow range of circumstances. See Steven
J. Wolhandler, Note, Voluntary Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill and the Constitutional Right to
Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 364 (1984) (observing that Shinto and Buddhism condone suicide
under some circumstances).
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had a right to physician assistance in hastening death.14 It further held
that denial of such aid did not deny the patient her equal protection
rights or constitute cruel and unusual punishment.' 5 A comparison with
the Canadian case reveals that the United States Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of a constitutional right of assisted suicide was in conformity with
the traditions of Western jurisprudence as revealed by a survey con-
ducted by the Canadian court. 16 However, at the end of its opinion in
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court noted that "[t]hroughout the
Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about
the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic
society."1 7 This leaves open the possibility of legislative adoption of a
system of assisted suicide in lieu of a constitutional liberty. But the
complex procedures erected under the court decisions, legislation, and
regulations in the Netherlands and Colombia, as well as the aborted
system of the Northern Territory of Australia, caution against the
recognition of such a "right" by statute or otherwise. These regimes, as
well as that passed by popular initiative in the state of Oregon, reveal that
society is unwilling to adopt a right of assisted suicide without elaborate
14. Opinion Chabot, supra note 8.
15. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 343 (Can.).
16. Id. at 401-04; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2264-66 (1997).
17. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275. The Court also stated that its opinion did "not absolutely fore-
close" a more particularized claim for physician assistance in hastening death, "[h]owever, given our
holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide heightened protec-
tion to the asserted liberty interest in ending one's life with a physician's assistance, such a claim
would have to be quite different from the ones advanced by respondents here." Id. at 2275 n.24. In
Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 n.13 (1997), the Court observed that "a particular plaintiff hoping
to show that New York's assisted-suicide ban was unconstitutional in his particular case would need to
present different and considerably stronger arguments than those advanced by respondents here."
Justice Stevens implied that a plaintiffs chances could be stronger when death was not only imminent,
but also pain relief was unsuccessful. See Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2308 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Breyer suggested that a better case for invalidating a law prohibiting assisted suicide might occur if the
state's laws also prevented adequate pain relief when death was near, thus resulting in serious and
otherwise unavoidable physical pain. Id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring). It is possible to read a
similar implication into O'Connor's opinion. See id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
One commentator has concluded that the legal barriers to pain relief that Justice Breyer posits
are not likely to occur so that any hope his opinion seems to raise for a future holding in favor of
assisted suicide is illusory. See Stuart Taylor Jr., To Sleep Perchance to Die: Why this Court Probably
Won't Create a Right to Assisted Suicide-Ever, LEGAL TIMES, July 14, 1997, at S33-34. But Taylor
quotes Professor Laurence Tribe, counsel for the plaintiffs in Vacco, as stating after the decision was
handed down that it was still possible that a right of assisted suicide could be found when the only
means of relieving pain was what his brief called the "particularly gruesome method [of] 'terminal
sedation'. . . to have [the patients'] minds chemically shut down and to be imprisoned in their decaying
bodies and deliberately starved to death, while loved ones keep a gruesome vigil." Id. at S34 (second
alteration added). See also Brief for Respondents at 43, Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (No. 95-1858)
available in 1996 WL 708912.
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safeguards to protect against abuse, such as the pressuring of vulnerable
patients to elect to end their lives.' 8
This Article contends that such complex procedures would not vindi-
cate private decision making, but instead would transform life's final
stage into a bureaucratic ordeal for those who asked for a physician's
aid in ending life. The complexity of the safeguards would create a pro-
cedural fog behind which pressure on vulnerable patients might flourish
rather than cease. The patient would not be an autonomous decision
maker, but only one among an intricate web of decision makers. The
"right" of assisted suicide would not be worth the risk of abuse it would
create.19 This article first examines the Canadian decision as a precursor
of the Untied States Supreme Court's action, then compares it with the
Court's opinions in Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill. The approaches
used in the Netherlands and Colombia, as well as the aborted system of
the Northern Territory of Australia, are examined as illustrations of the
proliferation of bureaucratic procedures invariably spawned by a right
of assisted suicide. The concluding section marshals arguments against
the bureaucratization of death that would be produced by the creation of
a right of assisted suicide.
II. CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS FOCUS ON PRESERVATION OF LIFE
In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General) the Supreme
Court of Canada balanced three powerful values: respect for life; a
compassionate interest in pain relief; and the right to personal autonomy
in making intimate decisions. The weighing process was further compli-
cated by equal protection arguments made by both sides, first by the
disabled plaintiff who claimed that a denial of assistance in ending her
life deprived her of equal access to suicide, and then by the defendant
government, which claimed that permitting assisted suicide would treat
vulnerable persons inequitably by pressuring them to choose death.20
The court's rejection of the plaintiff's arguments on behalf of assisted
18. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800-127.995 (1995) (codifying the Oregon Death With Dignity
Act, Measure 16, which was approved by voters on November 8, 1994 and survived a recall attempt
on November 4, 1997). The statute was later enjoined by Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D.
Or. 1995) vacated and remanded, 107 F.3d 1382, 1392 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Mar. 21, 1997),
as amended (Apr. 16, 1997), and cert. denied sub nom. Lee v. Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997).
19. "The legalization of physician-assisted suicide, ostensibly a measure enhancing the freedom
of dying patients, is in fact a deadly license for physicians to prescribe death, free from outside
scrutiny and immune from possible prosecution." Assisted Suicide in the United States, Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. 349
(1996) (testimony of Leon R. Kass, M.D.), microformed on CIS No. H521-66 (Congressional Info.
Serv.).
20. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 345 (Can.).
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suicide was met by a dissent proposal for a right entangled with
convoluted rules to prevent abuse.21
The Rodriguez case was brought by a woman who was terminally ill
with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's disease) which gave her
a life expectancy of two to fourteen months. Her condition was so
rapidly declining that she soon would be unable to "swallow, speak, walk
and move her body without assistance." 22 She brought suit to invalidate
the Canadian law that forbade counseling, aiding, or abetting another to
commit suicide.23 She contended that since she soon would be unable to
commit suicide on her own that the law blocking others from helping
her prevented her from exercising control over "the circumstances,
timing and manner of her death." 2 4 The specific provisions of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that she alleged were violated
included:
Section 7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security
of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
Section 12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.
Section 15(1). Every individual is equal before and under the
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit
of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 25
The rights guaranteed by the charter are not absolute. Section 1
states that "[tihe Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society."2 6 Rodriguez's strongest contentions were that the
law against assisted suicide impaired her section 7 right to "liberty and
security of the person" and her section 15(1) right to be free of discrim-
ination based on her "mental or physical disability." 27 Rodriguez
argued that her right to liberty and security of person was violated in that
21. Id. at 379-80, 384-86 (Lamer, C.J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 349.
23. Id. at 349-50. See R.S.C. ch. C-46, § 241(b) (1985) (Can.).
24. Rodriguez [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th at 349.
25. Id. at 350.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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the law against assisting another to commit suicide deprived her of "the
inherent dignity of a human person . . . the right to control what hap-
pens to her body while she is living . . . and the right to be free from
governmental interference in making fundamental personal decisions
concerning the terminal stages of her life." 28
Justice Sopinka, writing for the majority, concluded that the prohi-
bition of assisted suicide violated Rodriguez's right to liberty and
security of her person in that it deprived her of "autonomy over her
person and cause[d] her physical pain and psychological stress." 29
However, the complete prohibition of assisted suicide, with no exception
for the terminally ill, was justified under the principles of fundamental
human rights as a reasonable means of achieving the important goals of
protecting the sanctity of life and safeguarding vulnerable persons from
pressure to commit suicide. 30 In determining that the law against assisted
suicide was in accord with the principles of fundamental justice, the
Canadian high court conducted a survey of the law of Western democra-
cies. 31 The court decision it found to have the broadest influence was a
judgment of the European Commission of Human Rights which upheld
the United Kingdom's Suicide Act of 1961 against allegations that it
violated the rights of privacy and free expression found in articles 8 and
10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms. 32 The European Court held that assisting another to
commit suicide was not shielded by the right of privacy since it
encroached on the strong public interest in protecting the sanctity of
life.33 The Commission emphasized:
the State's legitimate interest in this area in taking measures to
protect, against criminal behaviour, the life of its citizens,
particularly those who belong to especially vulnerable
28. Id. at 387-88 (Sopinka, J.).
29. Id. at 391.
30. See id. at 406.
31. Id. at 401-04. One commentator argues:
[T]he reliance the majority places on social and political consensus in Canada and in
other Western democracies is open to criticism. First, such reliance represents a marked
departure from the role of the courts as legal guardians of the Constitution. Second, the
Court may simply be wrong, having mistaken majority preferences for consensus. Third,
in elevating majority preferences to constitutional stature, the Court offers no guidance to
legislators who are reviewing the policies underlying the ban on assisted suicide in
Canada.
Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, The Body and the Body Politic: Assisted Suicide Under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 39 McGILL L.J. 618, 620 (1994).
32. Rodriguez [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th at 402 (citing In the Application No. 10083/82 v. United
Kingdom, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. 140, 140-44 (1984) (considering the validity of the Suicide Act of 1961 of
the United Kingdom)).
33. Application No. 10083/82 v. United Kingdom, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. 140, 143 (1984).
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categories by reason of their age or infirmity. It recognizes the
right of the State under the Convention to guard against the
inevitable criminal abuses that would occur, in the absence of
legislation, against the aiding and abetting of suicide.34
The European Commission's decision was far from a perfect prece-
dent for the Canadian tribunal since it did not involve the privacy rights
of someone like Ms. Rodriguez, who was seeking assistance in commit-
ting suicide. Instead, it concerned the prosecution of an employee of the
Voluntary Euthanasia Society (EXIT) who was charged with aiding
others to commit suicide by referring them to his co-defendant who
allegedly then assisted the would-be suicide in performing the act.35 The
Commission observed that "[w]hile [the Suicide Act] might be thought
to touch directly on the private lives of those who sought to commit
suicide, it does not follow that the applicant's rights to privacy are
involved." 36 In contrast, a person with a severe and ultimately fatal
disability, such as Ms. Rodriguez, who was seeking assistance in perform-
ing a suicide that she could not accomplish alone, could argue that she
incurs a more direct and substantial injury from an anti-suicide law than
does an employee of a euthanasia organization.
The Canadian court concluded that as of 1993 no Western demo-
cracy expressly permitted assisted suicide. 37 The unifying principle in
Western jurisprudence is respect for the sanctity of life, but the court
noted that a distinction can be made between "passive and active forms
of intervention in the dying process." 38 "Active" forms, such as
assisted suicide, were forbidden but the cessation of life-prolonging treat-
ment, at the request of a terminally ill patient, was permitted even if this
was done with the knowledge that death soon would result.39 "Passive"
withdrawal of treatment merely removes technological impediments to
"natural" death. 40 The Rodriguez court observed that although some
commentators considered the distinction between "active" and "pas-
sive" intervention to be artificial, since both involved knowledge that
34. Rodriguez [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th at 402 (quoting Application No. 10083/82 v. United Kingdom,
6 Eur. H.R. Rep. 140, 144 (1984)).
35. Application No. 10083/82 v. United Kingdom, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 140-41.
36. Id. at 143.
37. Rodriguez [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th at 401-04. But in the Netherlands, which considered assisted
suicide and voluntary euthanasia technically illegal, a prosecution would not be brought if medical
standards set to guard against abuse were followed. Rodriguez [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th at 404. See
generally CARLOS F. GOMEZ, M.D., REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE
NETHERLANDS (1991). The Dutch practice is discussed in detail later in this Article beginning with the
text accompanying note 158.
38. Rodriguez [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th at 404.
39. Id. at 404-05.
40. Id. at 405.
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death would occur, the distinction had become widely accepted. 41 The
court found a further difference between active intervention, with the
primary purpose of causing death, and palliative care, which is primarily
designed to alleviate pain even though it is known that death will be
accelerated. 42 The latter was more likely to be permitted than the
former. 43 However, the court admitted that claims of "palliative care"
could be a mask concealing assisted suicide.44 The court apparently
concluded that the suicide assistance sought by Ms. Rodriguez was the
kind of active intervention in the dying process that could be prohibited
by the government.45
The court found that the law against assisted suicide did not consti-
tute cruel and unusual treatment or punishment under section 12 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms since the mere existence of
the law did not subject Rodriguez to the government's administrative or
justice system.46 The court also rejected contentions that the law violated
the applicant's equal protection rights under section 15(1) by denying
her access to suicide equal to that of able-bodied persons who would not
need assistance. 47 Even assuming that the law resulted in an unequal
imposition of burdens or grant of benefits, the disparate treatment was
justified under section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable and proportional
means of protecting life.4 8
The unspoken implication of the Rodriguez decision was that
disabled terminally ill people are vulnerable to pressure to speed their
death and deserved special government protection. The creation of an
exception to the general prohibition of assisted suicide that would permit
alleviation of suffering is impractical because it would be difficult to
differentiate those who provided aid out of humanitarian motives from
those who acted under a corrupt impulse.49 Any procedures designed to
41. Id. at 404-05 (citing Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die With Assistance,
105 HARV. L. REV. 2021, 2030-31 (1992) (criticizing the distinction between active and passive
intervention)).
42. Id. 405.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 405-06.
45. See id. at 404-06.
46. Id. at 407-1 I.
47. Id. at 409-10, 412.
48. Id. at 410-12. For a discussion of Rodriguez concluding that a comparative view of Western
and Eastern societies lends support to the slippery slope arguments against recognizing a right of
assisted suicide, see Katherine K. Young, A Cross-Cultural Historical Case Against Planned
Self- Willed Death and Assisted Suicide, 39 McGILL L.J. 657, 698-707 (1994).
49. See Rodriguez [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th at 411. One commentator argues that the plaintiff's
defeat in Rodriguez is only a temporary setback for assisted suicide advocates. See Jack R. London,
Exponential Change: Today is Already Tomorrow, 3 ANNALS HEALTH L. 153, 165 (1994). He contends
that "the right to assisted death, subject to necessary protections, perhaps along the model of the
Netherlands, is an inevitability." Id.
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implement such a differentiation would have to involve such intense
examination of the patient's personal circumstances that the privacy of
doctor, patient, and family would be severely circumscribed.
The rejection of the applicant's equal protection arguments by the
majority of justices was the target of Chief Justice Lamer's dissent, which
recognized a right of assisted suicide limited by a complex set of
restrictions. 50 The Chief Justice concluded that the equal protection
rights of the severely disabled were injured by the law because it closed
to them an important avenue of personal autonomy-the option of
choosing to end their lives by suicide-which was available to those
physically able to complete the act without assistance. 5 1 The burden was
on the state to justify this discrimination by demonstrating that it was (1)
designed to achieve a legitimate legislative purpose, (2) by means that
caused minimal impairment to equal protection rights.52
The Chief Justice admitted that the law against assisted suicide
served the substantial objectives of safeguarding life and protecting those
vulnerable to pressure to choose suicide. 53 However, the law flunked the
minimal impairment test. 54 The blanket prohibition of assisted suicide
was overbroad. Not all of the disabled were equally vulnerable. Further-
more, the plight of the mentally competent but physically disabled
person who was also terminally ill was readily distinguishable from that
of those who were not suffering their last illness. 55 For the terminally ill
"the choice is not whether to live as she is or to die, but rather when and
how to experience a death that is inexorably impending." 56 An absolute
prohibition of assisted suicide was unnecessary. The Chief Justice con-
tended that those who were mentally competent but physically unable to
act alone could be permitted to have assistance under safeguards
designed to ensure that the choice was voluntary and not the result of a
vulnerable person being pressured by those out for personal gain or bent
on getting rid of an unwanted burden. 57 The elaborate safeguards
suggested by the Chief Justice would have required the patient to receive
permission for the assistance by court order to ensure the voluntariness
50. Rodriguez [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th at 358-72 (Lamer, C.J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 369 (Lamer, C.J., dissenting).
52. See id. (Lamer, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 371 (Lamer, C.J., dissenting). For a critique of Lamer's equal protection arguments,
see Benjamin Freedman, The Rodriguez Case: Sticky Questions and Slippery Answers, 39 MCGILL L.J.
644, 648-49 (1994).
54. Rodriguez [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th at 378 (Lamer, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 376 (Lamer, C.J., dissenting). One commentator contends that granting persons like
Rodriguez a right to receive aid in hastening death would propel society down the slippery slope since
Rodriguez was not yet in the last stages of her illness and was not suffering unbearable pain. Young,
supra note 48, at 701.
56. Rodriguez [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th at 376 (Lamer, C.J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 377 (Lamer, C.J., dissenting).
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of the request and competence of the patient. He also would have
required "notice and access" to the coroner, certification by the treating
physician and an independent psychiatrist, and daily examinations to
ensure that competence and disability continued. 58
Under such a system, death would become an intricate official ritual
rather than a family or individual act. To run this evidentiary gauntlet, a
patient would have to place intimate facts on record for some third party,
presumably a judge, to decide whether each element had been satisfied.
Each requirement might be subjected to dispute by relatives, treating and
consulting doctors who disagree with the patient or one another, prose-
cutors, and health and life insurers. Whether or not they have traditional
legal standing, these potential parties could wreak bureaucratic havoc.
There is no indication that such hurdles could be surmounted with
sufficient speed to benefit a terminally ill patient. Such an approach
would be a boon for lawyers rather than a right for patients.
The majority opinion in Rodriguez is a precursor of the United
States Supreme Court's decisions in Glucksberg and Vacco especially in:
(1) the distinction it makes between the approved practice of termination
of life support to permit death from the underlying disorder and the
disapproved acts of assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia, which are
considered to be active interference in the natural order of dying; and
(2) its emphasis on the law's historical opposition to assisted suicide and
euthanasia.
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS IN
GLUCKSBERG AND VACCO: TRADITION BLOCKS THE PATH
DOWN. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
The law's traditional condemnation of assisted suicide formed the
keystone of two recent Supreme Court decisions. Washington v. Glucks-
berg59 involved an attack by terminally ill patients, and doctors who
treated such patients, on the Washington law banning assisted suicide on
the grounds that it violated an alleged liberty interest of terminally ill,
mentally competent adults to decide to hasten death and to receive the
58. Id. at 384-85 (Lamer, C.J., dissenting). The court was split 5-4 in Rodriguez. Id. at 343. In
addition to Lamer, Justices L'Heureux-Dub, Cory, and McLachlin dissented. Justice McLachlin's
dissent concluded that the plaintiffs right to make "decisions about her body" was invaded by the
prohibition on physician aid. See id. at 414. In another dissent, Justice Cory argued that the "right to
die with dignity should be as well protected as is any other aspect of the right to life." Id. at 413. See
also RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 260 (1995) in which the author argues for a right of
voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide "[i]n cases of terminally ill, pain-wracked, or severely
impaired people who are or anticipate shortly becoming physically incapable of committing suicide."
59. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
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aid of doctors in doing so. 60 The federal district judge concluded that
the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment in two respects: (1) it
unduly burdened an individual's Due Process Clause liberty to make
intimate personal decisions without state interference; and (2) it discrimi-
nated against terminally ill patients who were not on life support
systems. 61 It denied them physician assistance in ending their lives when
such aid was available to terminally ill patients on life-support who
needed medical assistance to disconnect the life-support to permit
death. 62 Thus, two similarly situated groups were treated differently
without justification. 63
This decision was reversed by a panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that concluded neither the text of the Con-
stitution nor history supported the finding of a liberty interest in killing
oneself. The differential treatment of the two groups of terminally ill
patients was justified since those on life-support systems were receiving
more intrusive treatment, which traditionally consisted of patient control
and physician assistance. 64 The court found it unnecessary to reach the
equal protection issues since it concluded that the assisted-suicide ban
was invalid because "[a] competent terminally ill adult having lived
nearly the full measure of his life, has a strong liberty interest in
choosing a dignified and humane death rather than being reduced at the
end of his existence to a childlike state of helplessness, diapered, sedated,
incontinent." 65 The state's normally substantial interest in preserving
life was reduced to its lowest point when the patient seeking assistance in
hastening death was already terminally ill.66 The state had substantial
interests in avoiding euthanasia erroneously performed on patients who
did not wish it, and had an interest in protecting vulnerable people such
as the elderly, the poor and the disabled from being pressured into
requesting assisted suicide. However, the state could accomplish these
goals by less intrusive means than Washington's complete ban on
assisted suicide.67
60. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2261-62. The statute attacked is WASH. REV.
CODE § 9A.36.060 (1994).
61. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459-66, 1466-67 (W.D. Wash.
1994) (discussing the due process violation and equal protection violations, respectively), rev'd, 49
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996), rev'd 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
62. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1466-67.
63. See id.
64. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded en banc, 79
F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996),
rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
65. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813-14.
66. Id. at 817, 820.
67. Id. at 824-26.
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When the Ninth Circuit enumerated these so-called less intrusive
means, we caught a graphic glance of the procedural labyrinth that
inevitably would accompany a right of assisted suicide. These means
include record keeping requirements, compulsory mental examinations
to ensure that the patient is not acting out of treatable depression, consul-
tation with other doctors to confirm the patient's terminal status and to
confirm that pain relief could not solve the problem, requirements for
witnesses to the patient's request to ensure voluntariness, waiting periods
to afford an opportunity for a change of mind, and so on down a maze
of red tape. 68 A liberty that can be so encumbered by the state is no
liberty at all.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's en banc ruling
because history and tradition precluded finding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraced a liberty interest in
receiving assistance in committing suicide. 69 Under the Court's substan-
tive due process analysis, the Court determines whether or not a claimed
liberty that is not enumerated in the Constitution is a fundamental right
by asking whether it is either firmly established in the Nation's history
or is an integral part of the concept of liberty. 70 The claimed fundamen-
tal liberty must be susceptible to a "careful description" so judicial
improvisation will be limited. 71 In accordance with the historical ap-
proach, the Glucksberg opinion observed that "for over 700 years, the
Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise
disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide." 72  The Court traced
the common law prohibition of suicide back to the Council of Hereford
in 673 at which the English absorbed the ecclesiastical ban on'that act.73
68. Id. at 833.
69. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271 (1997). For other examples of the Court's
use of the lack of a legal tradition supporting the existence of an unenumerated right as a reason for
rejecting it, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-94 (1986) (refusing to find that the right of
privacy protected adult consensual homosexual acts performed in the home) and see Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-80 (1989) (using a lack of historical support to refuse to expand parental
visitation rights to include unwed putative fathers of children born to mothers married to and residing
with another man).
70. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2262-63, 2268 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing the importance of whether or not the asserted right is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"), Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934) (asking whether the claimed right is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental"), and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (asking
whether the claimed right is so "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" that "neither liberty nor
justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed")).
71. Id. at 2268 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) and Collins v. Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
72. Id. at 2263.
73. Id. at 2263 n.9 (citing GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 257
(1957)).
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The common law commentators offer substantial evidence of the
historical condemnation of suicide under the Anglo-American legal
tradition. In the eighteenth century both William Blackstone and
Matthew Hale concluded that the common law considered suicide to be
an offense against God, King, and self.74 Blackstone observed that since
the law of England wisely and religiously considers that no
man hath a power to destroy life but by commission from God,
the author of it: and, as the suicide is guilty of a double
offence; one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the
Almighty and rushing into his immediate presence uncalled
for; the other temporal, against the king, who hath an interest in
the preservation of all of his subjects; the law has therefore
ranked this among the highest crimes, making it a peculiar
species of felony, a felony committed on one's* self.75
In eighteenth century England, the harshness of formal rules requir-
ing the forfeiture of movable property of a suicide was ameliorated by
juries' making liberal use of an exception that did not mandate for-
feiture if the act occurred when the perpetrator was of unsound mind. 76
As early as Bracton's thirteenth century work, On the Laws and Customs
of England, the strict system that resulted in forfeiture of all of the
property of a person who committed suicide to avoid arrest for a crime
was mitigated by exceptions that provided that no property was forfeited
if the perpetrator was insane at the time of the act, and that "if a man
[killed] himself in weariness of life or because he was unwilling to
endure further bodily pain" then only his "movable goods" were
forfeited.77 These exceptions showed compassion toward the innocent
survivors of the person committing suicide since they were the ones bear-
ing the brunt of the penalty. This attitude ultimately led to the decrimi-
nalization of suicide. In America, six of the thirteen original states had
abandoned penalties.for suicide by 1798.78 There is no evidence that
74. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, * 188-89 (1769); SIR MATTHEW H ALE, THE H ISTORY
OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 411-12 (Professional Books Ltd. 1971) (1736).
75. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189 (1769). In his review of the English criminal
law, Stephen noted that "[sluicide is held to be murder so fully, that every one who aids or abets
suicide is guilty of murder." See 3 SIR JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
104 (1883).
76. Thomas J. Marzen, et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 61 (1985).
77. 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 423-24 (S. Thorne trans.,
Harvard University Press 1968) (1250). 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 54
(1817) states that "Felo de se [a suicide] is a man, or woman, which being compos mentis, of sound
memory, and of the age of discretion, killeth himself, which being lawfully found by the oath of twelve
men, all the goods and chattels of the party so offending are forfeited."
78. See Marzen, supra note 76, at 67.
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suicide or attempted suicide was punished in America after the
Revolution. 79
Despite the decriminalization of suicide, assisting another to commit
that act remained subject to prosecution.80 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
author of the Court's opinion in Glucksberg, observed that "the prohibi-
tions against assisting suicide never contained exceptions for those who
were near death." 81 The lives of the terminally ill were as highly valued
as those of anyone else. 82 The prohibition of assisted suicide had a long
history in the United States with the first statute banning that practice
being passed by New York in 1828.83 When the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted, helping another to commit suicide was a crime in a majori-
ty of the states. 84 But Rehnquist was quick to point out that the condem-
nation of assisted suicide was not the decaying remnant of ancient laws.85
As medical science has extended the dying process, the impact of law on
end-of-life decisions has been re-examined, and generally the prohibi-
tion on assisted suicide has been confirmed. 86 Significantly, in 1991
Washington voters rejected an initiative that would have repealed the ban
on assisted suicide under carefully controlled circumstances. 87 This
continued American condemnation of assisted suicide is in line with the
approach of Western European countries as found by a survey made by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attor-
ney General).88 The decision of the Constitutional Court of Colombia
decriminalizing voluntary euthanasia was treated as an aberration. 89
79. See Catherine D. Shaffer, Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
348, 350 (1986).
80. See Glucksberg v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2265 (1997).
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (1872)).
83. Id. (citing Act of Dec. 10, 1828, ch. 20, § 4, 1828 N.Y. Laws 19 (codified at 2 N.Y. REV.
STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, §7, p. 661 (1829))).
84. Id.; see also Marzen, supra note 76, at 73-7. But see Ronald Dworkin, Assisted Suicide:
What the Court Really Said, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Sept. 25, 1997, at 40 which criticizes Rhenquist's
view of the influence of history on Due Process Clause analysis as being too narrow in that it "protects
individuals only from laws that few states have seen any reason to enact, and offers no protection at
all against historically popular invasions of individual freedom."
85. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2265.
86. Id. at 2265-66
87. Id. at 2266.
88. Rodriguez [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th 401-04.
89. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2266-67 n. 16 (citing Sentencia No. C-239/97 Corte Constitucional,
May 20, 1997 (Colom.), as an exception to the recent international trend of government action against
assisted suicide and euthanasia). More persuasive was the Canadian decision in Rodriguez and a
recommendation of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics of the British House of Lords against
changing that country's ban on assisted suicide. Id.; see House of Lords Session 1993-94 Report of the
Select Committee on Medical Ethics, Volume 1-Report Part 3 Opinions of the Committee in 12 ISSUES
IN L. & MED. 193, 202 (1996). The Committee adamantly stated "we identify no circumstances in
which assisted suicide should be permitted, nor do we see any reason to distinguish between the act of
a doctor or any other person in this connection." Id. at 202.
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The Supreme Court's focus on history, the keystone to determining
whether an unenumerated fundamental right existed, stood in sharp
contrast to the approach taken in the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in
which that court determined that it was error to conclude "that a histori-
cal analysis alone is [a] sufficient basis for rejecting plaintiffs' claim to a
substantive liberty interest or right." 90 The Ninth Circuit had empha-
sized that the formal history, the condemnation of assisted suicide in the
law books, did not tell the complete story. A covert tradition of doctors
helping those who were terminally ill and in great pain to commit suicide
existed along with the formal prohibition of that practice. 9' However,
the Supreme Court concentrated on the formal history rather than
getting lost in a bog of conjecture about secret practices.
Recent Supreme Court precedents had not undermined the Ameri-
can legal tradition against assisted suicide. 92 The plaintiffs contended
that a right of personal autonomy had been established that embraced all
varieties of intimate personal decisions, including the ability of terminal-
ly ill patients to decide the timing and manner of death and obtain
doctor assistance in carrying out their decisions. 93 Cruzan v. Missouri
Department of Health94 concerned a young woman who entered a
persistent vegetative state after being injured in an automobile accident.95
Her parents sought permission to disconnect life support systems so that
she could die of the underlying injuries in accordance with what they
contended were her wishes expressed while she was still competent. 96
The Supreme Court held that there was a well established common-law
right not to undergo medical treatment, especially that involving a
physical intrusion, unless the patient gave informed consent to the
procedure. 97 The Court assumed for purposes of deciding the case
"that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition," but that the state could require "clear and convincing
evidence" that the patient, while competent, had declared that she did
not want to be maintained on life supports.98 The Glucksberg opinion
90. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 1996).
91. Id. at 810 (citing Julia Pugliese, Note, Don't Ask-Don't Tell: The Secret Practice of
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1291, 1295 (1993)).
92. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2269-72. The court concludes that neither Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing a right to refuse treatment) nor Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming the woman's right to choose abortion in the early stages of
pregnancy) served as authority for developing a right of assisted suicide. Id.
93. Id. at 2269 (describing the contentions of plaintiffs/respondents).
94. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
95. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265 (1990).
96. Id. at 267-68.
97. Id. at 277-78.
98. Id. at 279-84.
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gave a modest interpretation to what had been established in Cruzan. It
did not establish a broad concept of personal autonomy, but merely
confirmed the common law tradition that unwanted medical treatment
was a battery and thus could be refused by the patient.99
The Court of Appeals en banc decision invoked a line of Supreme
Court cases developing a right to make intimate personal decisions with
regard to such matters as marriage, procreation, family disputes, and rais-
ing and educating children.100 The Court of Appeals especially relied
on the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
which reaffirmed the Due Process Clause liberty interest of women to
decide to have an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy, as establish-
ing a general right of intimate decision-making.' 0' The Casey opinion
referred to a liberty to make "intimate and personal choices" that were
"central to personal dignity and autonomy."1 02 In Glucksberg, the
Supreme Court refused to give such an expansive interpretation to the
language that it would establish a general right of personal autonomy.
The Court noted that even though "many of the rights and liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy [that]
does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, inti-
mate, and personal decisions are so protected."' 103 Only those intimate
decisions that meet the Court's test of historical recognition would
receive protection.104 The right asserted by the Glucksberg plaintiffs
failed this historical test. The Court concluded "that the asserted 'right'
to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause."105 Thus, Washington's ban on
assisted suicide will not be subjected to strict scrutiny. The state need
99. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2270.
100. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813 (1996) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital right of privacy includes use of contraceptives); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of unmarried people to use contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion rights); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (family decisions concerning the raising and educating of children)).
101. Id. at 801-02 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
102. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
103. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271 (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 33-5 (1973)).
104. Id. at 2268. But see Michael S. Moore, The Dead Hand of Constitutional Tradition, 19 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 263, 272-73 (1995) (criticizing deference to tradition as not being a real suspension
of subjective judgment but only a mask for "our own political conclusions"). See also, Timothy L.
Raschke Shattuck, Note, Justice Scalia's Due Process Methodology. Examining Specific Traditions, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 2743, 2788-89 (1992) (arguing that while the use of tradition as the chief tool to
determine whether or not a liberty exists does involve difficulties, such as deciding what traditions are
relevant and what kind of evidence determines their existence, it is a useful restraint on excessive
judicial discretion).
105. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
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only show that the law is "rationally related to legitimate government
interests."106
The assisted suicide ban passed this deferential standard. 107 It was
rationally related to several legitimate state interests. 108  Paramount
among these is the state's general interest in protecting life and its
specific interest in preventing suicide. 109 The Supreme Court rejected
the approach of the en banc ruling of the Court of Appeals that had
recognized that the state normally had a strong interest in preserving life,
but that interest was diminished when the patient was terminally ill.I10
Using such a "sliding-scale approach" to determine the value of life
would mire the Court and the states down in a swamp of highly subjec-
tive judgments concerning the quality of life. 1I
The Supreme Court properly rejected the sliding-scale approach
since it would have encouraged an attitude of devaluing the lives of the
vulnerable, such as the disabled, the elderly, the terminally ill, the poor
and minorities, with the result that they would not receive equal protec-
tion, and ultimately everyone's security would be diluted. In addition to
being a facet of the state's life-preservation interest, protection of the
vulnerable is treated by the Court as an independent state interest that
deserves special consideration, particularly in light of the cost-cutting
mentality that could pressure the vulnerable into choosing assisted
suicide. 112
The state also has a substantial interest in protecting the ethics of the
medical profession. The Court concluded that the state was justified in
deciding that assisting in suicide would clash with the medical profes-
sion's role as healers. "13 The Supreme Court rejected the approach of
the Court of Appeals which viewed aiding a terminally ill patient to carry
out his or her desire to hasten death to be a facet of a doctor's duty to
relieve pain.114
The state has an interest in ensuring that a purported right of
personal choice does not lead to a negation of personal choice. The
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2271-72.
109. Id. at 2272.
110. Id.; see also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 817, 820 (1996) (concluding
that the state's life protection interest was reduced when patient was terminally ill or comatose).
111. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2272.
112. Id. 2272-73 (citing NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 120 (1994) (hereinafter NEW
YORK TASK FORCE)).
113. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. at 2273; see also Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Decisions
Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2233 (1993) and NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 112, at
103-09.
114. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2273; Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 829.
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Court observed that "the State may fear that permitting assisted suicide
will start down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary
euthanasia.""l 5 The Supreme Court was not convinced, as the Court of
Appeals was, that the right could be limited to "'competent, terminally
ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication
prescribed by doctors."' 11 6 The Court of Appeals fueled this fear by
noting that a choice by "a duly appointed surrogate decision maker is
for all legal purposes the decision of the patient himself."' 17 It further
expanded the possible decision makers by noting that when the patient is
unable to give the drugs to himself or herself, "administration by the
physician . . . may be the only way the patient may be able to receive
them."' 18 Rather than vindicating personal choice, a right of assisted
suicide could increase the power of physicians and increase the role of
government which probably would develop an elaborate administrative
structure to guard against abuse of such power.
The Supreme Court's embrace of the slippery-slope argument, that
adoption of a right of assisted suicide inevitably leads down hill to
involuntary euthanasia, was strongly influenced by the international
scene, especially the Dutch experience. The Court was especially struck
by a Dutch study revealing "that in 1990, there were 2,300 cases of
voluntary euthanasia, defined as 'the deliberate termination of another's
life at his request,' 400 cases of assisted suicide, and more than 1,000
cases of euthanasia without an explicit request."1 9 The slide down the
slippery slope has been even more precipitous than the Court indicates.
As the detailed discussion later in this Article will demonstrate, in the
Chabot case, the High Court of the Netherlands determined that severe
depression, unaccompanied by terminal, or even physical illness, could
justify a doctor in assisting in suicide if the proper procedures were
followed.120 The Dutch system has produced several paradoxes: an in-
formal increase in physician power along with excessive legalization of
end-of-life decisions, physicians seizing the initiative and making
end-of-life decisions for patients in some situations while permitting
patient manipulation of doctors into assisting in suicide in others.121
115. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2274.
116. Id. (citing Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838).
117. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 832 n.120.
118. Id. at 831.
119. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2274 (citing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the
Netherlands: A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady to the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 104 Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11 (Comm. Print 1996)). See also Richard
Fenigsen, The Report of the Dutch Governmental Committee on Euthanasia, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 339
(1991).
120. See infra notes 191-210 and accompanying text (discussing the Opinion Chabot).
121. Herbert Hendin, M.D., Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients and the Dutch Cure, 10 ISSUES
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Justice Souter's concurring opinion also placed heavy reliance on
the "Dutch experience" to fortify the state's slippery slope argu-
ment. 122 He observed that the proposed right of assisted suicide would
not be "readily containable." 123 Limiting the right to those who made
voluntary requests for aid would be difficult because it would depend
upon making subtle judgments about the patient's state of mind. 124
Doctors might be tempted to exceed their mandate from the patient. 125
He noted that assisted suicide proponents have proposed an intricate set
of safeguards against such abuses.126 These included requiring that the
patient's request be made repeatedly over a set period of time, requiring
that records be kept and reported to public officials, and that "two
qualified physicians confirm the patient's diagnosis, prognosis and
competence."1 27 Souter was not convinced that these safeguards would
effectively stop abuse.128 The proposed requirements were similar to the
guidelines used in the Netherlands where "physicians must engage in
consultation before proceeding, and must decide whether the patient's
decision is voluntary, well considered, and stable, whether the request to
die is enduring and made more than once, and whether the patient's
future will involve unacceptable suffering."1 29 Even though the nature
of the "Dutch experience" was subject to debate, Souter concluded that
there was enough evidence that their complex guidelines had not
checked abuse for the state to have a reasonable basis for concluding
that prohibition rather than regulation of assisted suicide was the pre-
ferred course. 130 In sum, the state had a legitimate interest in avoiding a
trip down the slippery slope, that would end in involuntary euthanasia,
and the "Dutch experience" furnished evidence that this view was not
just the product of over-heated legislative imagination.
After surveying the interests the state presented in justification of its
assisted suicide prohibition, the Supreme Court majority decided that
"[t]hey are unquestionably important and legitimate, and Washington's
ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably related to their promotion
and protection."131 Thus the Court refused to find either a general right
L. & MED. 123 (1994); see also Fenigsen, supra note 119. For a more positive view of the Dutch
experience, see PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR TRADITIONAL
ETHICS 152-53 (1994).
122. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2292 (Souter, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 2291.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2290-92.
129. Id. (citing CARLOS GOMEZ, M.D., REGULATING DEATH: EUTHENASIA AND THE CASE OF THE
NETHERLANDS 40-3 (1991) (describing the Dutch guidelines)).
130. Id. at 2292 (citing HERBERT HENDIN, M.D., SEDUCED BY DEATH: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND THE
DUTCH CURE 75-84 (1997) (arguing that the Dutch guidelines have not stopped abuse)).
131. Id. at 2275.
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of assisted suicide or one limited to "'competent, terminally ill
adults."" 3 2 On the same day it decided Glucksberg the Court ruled on
the companion case of Vacco v. Quill.133 Quill and two other doctors
sued officials of the state of New York claiming that the state violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by treating
132. Id. (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 838 (1996)). All of the
justices concurred in Glucksberg but several filed separate opinions which applied to both that case
and Vacco. Justice O'Connor agreed that there was no general right of assisted suicide, nor a right
limited to the terminally ill who made voluntary requests. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.'at 2303 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). It was too difficult to define terminal illness or make an accurate determination of
whether the requests were voluntary. Id. O'Connor further concluded that there was no need to
address the question of whether "a mentally competent person who [was] experiencing great
suffering ha[d] a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her
imminent death" since there were no "legal barriers to obtaining medication" from a doctor for pain
relief even if it brought death. Id. But Justice O'Connor overestimates the availability of pain relief
medication. See C. Stratton Hill, Editorial, When Will Adequate Pain Treatment Be the Norm, 274
JAMA 1881, 1882 (1995) (contending that even cancer patients can expect health care professionals
to resist furnishing pain relief in the form of opiates); American Pain Society Quality of Care
Committee, Consensus Statement, Quality Improvement Guidelines for Treatment of Acute Pain and
Cancer Pain, 274 JAMA 1874, 1874 (1995) (observing that "[a] high prevalence of unrelieved pain"
is due to lack of education of medical professionals about pain relief techniques, concerns about
possible addiction, federal regulation of drugs, and cumbersome insurance regulations); Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Cries of the Dying Awaken Doctors to a New Approach, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1997, A l, A l l
(observing that the high drug dosages sometimes necessary to relieve pain in the dying often are not
prescribed because doctors may lack knowledge of the technique, and may fear prosecution).
Justice Stevens agreed that history and tradition generally supported the ban on assisted suicide
but there could be circumstances when a terminally ill person, whose death was imminent and whose
pain could not be relieved, could have a personal dignity interest that outweighed the state's interest in
preserving life, protecting the vulnerable and upholding the ethics of the medical profession.
Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. at 2304-10 (Stevens, J., concurring). To Stevens, Cruzan did more than
recognize the common law rights to be free from batteries and refuse medical treatment, and Casey
did more than affirm the core of a woman's abortion rights; together they established a right to make
intimate decisions without undue state interference. Id. at 2307 (citing Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
Although Justice Souter concurred in the judgment, his analytical approach differed somewhat
from the Court's opinion. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275-93. He too emphasized tradition as the
keystone to determining whether or not a substantive due process right existed. Id. at 2283. However,
by adopting an analytical approach used by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, he used a
more flexible method in determining whether a state had unduly infringed upon a Due Process Clause
liberty. This approach asked whether the state's actions were "arbitrary impositions" or "purposeless
restraints." Id. at 2275 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). He
concluded that the individual interests involved in the case were important enough to require
subjecting the laws to "careful scrutiny." Id. at 2290. But the state interests in protecting life and
safeguarding the terminally ill from being subjected to involuntary euthanasia outweighed the
individual interests. Id. at 2290. Like the majority, Souter used an international perspective focusing
on the Dutch experience. Even though whether or not the Dutch approach had led to abuses, such as
involuntary euthanasia, was subject to debate, there was enough chance that it had to justify states in
using that experience as a reason for prohibiting assisted suicide. Id. at 2290-92. These ambiguities
were better resolved by the legislative than the judicial process. Id. at 2292-93.
The brief concurrences of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer expressed agreement with Justice
O'Connor. Justice Breyer noted that a stronger case for striking down laws prohibiting assisted suicide
might be made if there were also legal barriers to adequate pain relief when death was imminent and
physical pain was severe. Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring). See also, Dworkin, supra note 84, at
40-4 (arguing that the Court's unanimity was "deceptive," especially with regard to Rehnquist's
historical approach, and that a different result might be reached if a future plaintiff made a stronger
case for needing assisted suicide to avoid pain).
133. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
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differently two classes of patients who were similarly situated in that both
were composed of terminally ill people. 134 The plaintiffs claimed that
terminally ill patients on life-support systems were permitted to obtain
physician assistance in hastening death by disconnecting the systems but
terminally ill patients not on life support were prevented by law from
obtaining the aid of doctors in hastening their death.' 35 The district
court rejected these arguments but the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed. 136 The Second Circuit ruled that the
differential treatment of the two classes of terminally ill patients was not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest insofar as it stopped
physicians "from prescribing medications to be self-administered by a
mentally competent, terminally-ill person in the final stages of his
terminal illness."1 37 The Supreme Court reversed. 138
Chief Justice Rehnquist, author of the majority opinion, first ob-
served that since the New York statutes did not infringe upon a funda-
mental right or create suspect classifications, they were entitled to a
presumption of validity.1 39 The thrust of the Court's reasoning was that
there was no differential treatment at all: everyone, terminally ill or not,
could refuse medical treatment, and no one could get physician assis-
tance in committing suicide. 140 Moreover, assisting suicide and rejecting
life-preserving care were not equivalent acts. 141 The two acts were
distinguishable both as to "causation and intent." 142 The death of a
patient who refused treatment was caused by the underlying disorder not
by the refusal, but a patient who took a lethal dose of drugs died because
of the drugs. 143 A doctor who complied with a patient's request to
134. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2296. Originally three "gravely ill patients" were also plaintiffs but
they died and the cases were continued by the doctors who said they wanted to help terminally ill
patients who sought assistance in hastening death but they were prevented by New York laws. Id. at
2296 & n.4.
135. Id. at 2296 & n.1-2 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(3) (McKinney 1987) (explaining that
causing or aiding another to commit suicide is manslaughter in the second degree), N.Y. PuB. HEALTH
LAW, Art. 29-B, §§ 2960-2979 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997) (permitting competent adult patients to
issue do-not-resuscitate orders), and N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW, Art. 29-B, §§ 2980-2994 (providing for
the appointment of health care agents with power to refuse life-preserving procedures)).
136. Quill v. Koppel, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub noma., Quill v. Vacco, 80
F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996), rev'd 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
137. Quill, 80 F.3d at 731.
138. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2296.
139. Id. at 2297.
140. Id. at 2297-98.
141. Id. at 2298. The same distinction was made earlier in Michigan v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d
714 (Mich. 1994), where the court, in rejecting claims that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, embraced a right of assisted suicide. The same theme is stressed in a decision rendered
shortly after Vacco in Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1997) (holding that the state prohibition
on assisted suicide does not violate the right of privacy under the state constitution or the federal Equal
Protection Clause).
142. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2298.
143. Id.
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withhold life-saving treatment did not intend death but only the avoid-
ance of pointless treatment, and the patient who made such a request did
not seek death so much as freedom from technological shackles. 144 The
primary intent of a physician who gave palliative care that could cause
death was the relief of pain, not death.145 The distinction between assist-
ing suicide and refusing treatment was so well established that it was not
irrational for New York to make it.146 The distinction was accepted in
medical as well as legal circles. 147
A similar approach is seen in Great Britain. In 1993, Great Britain's
highest court, the House of Lords, decided Airedale N.H.S. Trust v.
Bland, in which it approved the application of hospital officials, acting
with the concurrence of the patient's parents, to remove life-support
systems from a young man who had been in a persistent vegetative state
for three years, ever since he was injured in a soccer game riot.14 8 The
House of Lords also differentiated between discontinuance of life-sup-
port in the best interest of a patient in a persistent vegetative state and
euthanasia of terminally ill but competent patients.149 The vital distinc-
tion was between acts and omissions. 150 Glanville Williams characterized
the termination of life-support as "in substance not an act but an omis-
sion to struggle" which is "not a breach of duty by the doctor, because
he is not obliged to continue in a hopeless case." 151 The omission
introduced no new harm but merely allowed a "pre-existing condition"
to take its natural course towards death.152
The recognition that a doctor is not required to persist in a hopeless
case is reminiscent of the view expressed by Socrates in Plato's Republic
when describing the proper ethical standards for physicians. He stated
that "but where the body was diseased through and through, he
[Asclepius, paragon of doctors] would not try by nicely calculated
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2298-99.
146. See id. at 2299 (citing Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 82 n.2 (1990); In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647, 665, 670 n.9, People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728 (Mich. 1994). The Court claimed
that the distinction was "implicitly" made in Cruzan. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2301 (citing Cruzan v.
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79, 287-88 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
147. See Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2298 n.6 (quoting American Medical Association, Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Physician-Assisted Suicide, 10 IssuEs L. & M ED., 91, 93 (1994)) (noting
that the American Medical Association stressed the "'fundamental difference between refusing
life-sustaining treatment and demanding a life-ending treatment').
148. See Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, I All E.R. 821, 862, 896 (Fain. 1993) (Appeal taken
from C.A.).
149. Id. at 867 (Judgment of Lord Goff).
150. Id.
151. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 282 (2d ed. 1983). Williams was quoted
in the Airedale decision. Airedale, I All E.R. at 892 (Judgment of Lord Mustill).
152. See Airedale, I All. E.R. at 867-68. The Supreme Court cited Airedale in Vacco. Vacco,
117 S. Ct. at 2299 n.8.
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evacuations and doses to prolong a miserable existence."153 Even con-
servative religious ethicists distinguish refraining from medical treatment
that is unlikely to aid the patients, and may unnecessarily prolong
suffering, from acts affirmatively seeking death as a mode of pain relief.
The latter, not the former, is condemned. John Paul II in his Encyclical
Letter, Evangelium Vitae (Gospel of Life) observed that:
Euthanasia must be distinguished from the decision to forego
so-called "aggressive medical treatment," in other words,
medical procedures which no longer correspond to the real
situation of the patient, either because they are now dispropor-
tionate to any expected results or because they impose an
excessive burden on the patient and his family. In such
situations, when death is clearly imminent and inevitable, one
can in conscience "refuse forms of treatment that would only
secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, so
long as the normal care due to the sick person in similar cases
is not interrupted."1 54
Thus, the distinction made by New York, permitting medical assis-
tance in disconnecting life-support systems but prohibiting doctor-
assisted suicide, although not ineluctable, has respected support. The
Supreme Court concluded that preserving the distinction is rationally
related to numerous state interests "including prohibiting intentional
killing and preserving life; preventing suicide; maintaining physicians'
role as patients' healers protecting vulnerable people from indifference,
prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives;
and avoiding a possible slide towards euthanasia."155
What was left unsaid in Vacco was that the "right" Quill was
seeking was so restricted as to amount to no right at all. In his book,
Death and Dignity, Quill lists a complex set of safeguards that would
circumscribe the right of assisted suicide in order to make it more
palatable to life protection advocates and to provide surer protection for
153. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 97 (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., First Am. Ed.,
Oxford University Press 1945).
154. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: EVANGELIUM VITAE (GOSPEL OF LIFE) Sec. 65 at p.
117 (1995) (quoting CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, Declaration on Euthanasia lura et
Bona 551 (5 May 1980)).
155. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2302. Most of the concurring opinions discussed above in connection
with Glucksberg applied also to Vacco. Justice Souter filed a separate concurrence in Vacco. Vacco,
117 S. Ct. at 2302 (Souter, J., concurring). However, he accorded "the claims raised by the patients
and physicians in this case and Washington v. Glucksberg, a high degree of importance, requiring a
commensurate justification." Id. This standard of review seems somewhat more rigorous than the
rational scrutiny applied by the majority to New York's law. Souter also appeared to give himself
some flexibility for a future change in position by pointedly saying that he did not consider the
plaintiffs to be asserting fundamental rights "at this time." Id.
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physicians against civil and criminal liability.' 5 6 These safeguards
include the following requirements that must be satisfied before a
physician assists in a suicide:
1. The patient must, of his own free will and at his own
initiative, clearly and repeatedly request to die rather than
continue suffering.
2. The patient's judgment must not be distorted [by
depression or mental illness].
3. The patient must have a condition that is incurable, and
associated with severe, unrelenting, intolerable suffering.
4. The physician must ensure that the patient's suffering and
the request are not the result of inadequate comfort care.
5. Physician-assisted suicide should only be carried out in
the context of a meaningful doctor-patient relationship.
6. Consultation with another experienced physician is
required to ensure the voluntariness and rationality of the
patient's request, the accuracy of the diagnosis and prognosis,
and the full exploration of comfort-oriented alternatives.
7. Clear documentation to support each condition above is
required. 157
As well-intentioned as Quill's safeguards are as measures to protect
against involuntary euthanasia and uninformed requests to hasten death,
they are likely to transform private decisions concerning death into a
complex process involving consultants and court proceedings, before
and after death, contesting whether each nuance of the procedures has
been met. The maze that such regulations can create is illustrated by
Opinion Chabot from the Netherlands which is discussed below.
156. TIMOTHY E. QUILL, M.D., DEATH AND D iGNrrY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE 161-65
(1993).
157. Id. Quill recently argued that such procedures would make more open the current practice
of coven assisted suicide. Doctors would be more free to seek second opinions and directly address
the patient's fear of a long and painful death. With a meaningful option of assisted suicide, patient's
might more candidly explore alternatives such as palliative care. For a discussion of Quill's views, see
Alexandra Dylan Lowe, Facing the Final Exit, A.B.A.J., Sept. 1997, at 48, 52.
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A key element in Glucksberg and Vacco as well as in the Canadian
and European Commission of Human Rights decisions is the fear that
recognition of a right of terminally ill, competent patients to assisted-
suicide would impel law and morality rapidly downhill toward first volun-
tary and then involuntary euthanasia. Fuel for argument that creating
those rights could produce such dire results may be furnished by recent
events in the Netherlands. These events also demonstrate the prolif-
eration of complex, but only sporadically effective regulations that
accompany toleration of assisted suicide, regulations that enmesh doctors
and patients in a thick underbrush of procedure.
IV. THE NETHERLANDS, NORTHERN AUSTRALIA, AND
COLOMBIA: THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF END OF LIFE
DECISIONS
A. THE NETHERLANDS: COMPLEX GUIDELINES Do NOT STOP
"PSYCHIC SUFFERING" FROM BEING THE BASIS OF ASSISTED
SUICIDE
Although assisted suicide and euthanasia are technically against the
criminal law in the Netherlands, penalties will not be imposed on physi-
cians performing these acts when "special circumstances" amounting to
force majeure are present. 158 Herbert Hendin describes this condition as
existing when the physician is confronted by "an overpowering conflict
between the law-which makes euthanasia illegal-and his responsibility
to help a patient, which makes euthanasia necessary."' 59 Carlos Gomez
points out that: "The term force majeure, little known or used in this
country, is borrowed from the French and means, literally, 'a greater
force.' . . . The term means something like an irresistible force (e.g., a
patient's extreme and enduring pain forces the physician to do
something outside normal practice)." 60
158. Hendin, supra note 121, at 134-35; see also GOMEZ, supra note 37, at 28-39. Gomez cites
article 293 of the Netherlands Penal Code which states that: "He who robs another of life at his ex-
press and serious wish is punished with a prison sentence of at most twelve years or a fine of the fifth
category [maximum of 100,000 guilders, about $50,000 under exchange rates in 1990]." Id. at 19, 147
n.l. He also cites article 294 of the Penal Code which declares that: "He who deliberately incites
another to suicide, assists him therein or provides him with the means is punished, if the suicide
follows, with a prison sentence of at most three years or a fine of the fourth category [maximum of
25,000 guilders, about $12,500 under 1990 exchange rates]." Id. at 19, 147 n.2; see also J.K.M.
Gevers, What the Law Allows: Legal Aspects of Active Euthanasia on Request in the Netherlands, in
EUTHANASIA: THE GOOD OF THE PATIENT, THE GOOD OF SocIETY 69-70 (Robert I. Misbin ed. 1992).
159. Hendin, supra note 121, at 135.
160. See GOMEZ, supra note 37, at 150 n.26.
[VOL. 73:641666
AVOIDING A BUREAUCRACY OF DEATH
The Royal Dutch Society for the Promotion of Medicine (KNMG)
used similar language when it said that "in a decision to honor a request
for euthanasia, the point of departure has always been that the doctor
and the patient must stand with their backs to the wall, that is to say that
they no longer see any possibility of making the suffering of the patient
bearable."161
The force majeure doctrine has been refined by the development of
a set of intricate guidelines that permit doctors who perform euthanasia,
or assist in a suicide to escape punishment when: (1) a patient volun-
tarily, knowingly and persistently requests the procedure; (2) "unbear-
able suffering cannot be relieved by other means"; (3) the performing
physician consults another doctor; and (4) deaths resulting from such
procedures are reported to the government.162
A 1995 case refined the guidelines so that they could deal with the
dilemma posed by a newborn infant who was incapable of making a
request for euthanasia. 163 Dr. Prins was tried by the district court in
Alkmaar for injecting a newborn infant suffering from hydrocephaly,
spina bifida, and leg deformaties with a "muscle paralyzer" and a
"sleep-inducing drug."' 164 Since the baby "screamed when touched"
and could survive only a few months at best, the action was considered
merciful.1 65 Dr. Prins consulted with other doctors concerning alterna-
tives and obtained the approval of the parents. 166 The baby died in her
mother's arms fifteen minutes after the injection. 167 Although the pro-
secutors did not doubt that the guideline's requirements of "unbearable
pain" and consultation with other doctors had been met, they needed
judicial guidance concerning the voluntary-request requirement when
the patient was unable to make a request.168 The court concluded that
the doctor should not be subjected to punishment since the child's
"parents had explicitly, repeatedly and consistently asked for the
termination of life."' 169
A recent case has raised troubling questions concerning whether the
guidelines have become so malleable that they afford insufficient
161. Id. at 37.
162. Hendin, supra note 121, at 135.
163. Jenifer Chao, Dutch Doctor on Trial for Killing Painfully Deformed Newborn, OREGONIAN
(Portland), Apr. 13, 1995, at A9.
164. Id.
165. Id. One report described the infant as a "sleeping plant." See Dutch Doctor Convicted but
not Punished for Euthanasia of Infant, 14 MONASH BIOETHICS REV. 5 (1995), cited in Roger S.
Magnusson, The Sanctity of Life and the Right to Die, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1997).
166. Chao, supra note 163.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Jenifer Chao, The Dutch Court Absolves Doctor in Killing, OREGONIAN (Portland), Apr. 28,
1995, at A6.
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protection to vulnerable patients whose ailments are psychological rather
than physical. In 1991 a Dutch psychiatrist, Dr. Chabot, was consulted
by a patient, Holly Bosscher, a fifty-year old woman who did not suffer
from a terminal-physical illness but was severely depressed because of
her divorce and the deaths of her father and two sons, one son by suicide
and the other by cancer. 170 She had attempted suicide earlier and was
planning to try again.171 She contacted Dr. Chabot, not to receive
therapy, but to get his help in ensuring that her next attempt would be
successful so that she could be laid to rest in a grave between those of
her two sons. 172 After several sessions with the patient, Chabot conclud-
ed that Bosscher would attempt suicide again and would do so by violent
means. 173 Faced with this specter of his patient either succeeding in a sui-
cide by horrible and shocking means or botching the attempt and exacer-
bating her condition, Chabot decided to aid her. 174 Before proceeding,
he presented his conclusions for review by seven experts.175 Five con-
curred with his findings, but they did so on the basis of his presentation
and did not examine the patient.176 Reinforced by the agreement of the
consultants, Chabot, accompanied by two witnesses, went to Bosscher's
home and asked if she wished to proceed.177 When she said yes, he gave
her lethal medicine which she stirred into a pudding.178 She died soon
after ingesting it and Chabot informed the police.179
Even though assisting suicide was a crime under Dutch law, it could
be justified and unpunishable if an emergency made it necessary.1 80 If
the patient's suffering was beyond endurance and there was no hope of
recovery, an emergency existed. 181 On April 21, 1993 the district court
at Assen decided that Bosscher's condition met this standard.182 She had
refused treatment and threatened that her next suicide attempt would be
170. Gene Kaufmann, Case Note, State v. Chabot: A Euthanasia Case from the Netherlands, 20
OHIo N.U. L. REV. 815, 816-17 (1994). For another description of the facts of the case, see Alison C.
Hall, Note, To Die With Dignity, Comparing Physician Assisted Suicide in the United States, Japan and
the Netherlands, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 803, 828 n.174 (1996).
171. Kaufman, supra note 170, at 817.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 818.
179. Id. at 817-18; see also Herbert Hendin, M.D., The Slippery Slope: The Dutch Example, 35
DUQ. L. REV. 427, 429 (1996).
180. See Griffiths, supra note 8, at 240-41.
181. Id. For a discussion of the "necessity" defense to assisted suicide in the Netherlands, see
Julia Belian, Deference to Doctors in Dutch Euthanasia Law, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 255, 256-57
(1996).
182. Griffiths, supra note 8, at 232-33.
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violent if she were left to her own devices.183 The consultants told Dr.
Chabot that even if she were amenable to treatment, it would take a long
time and would not lead to a full recovery.184
There are several aspects of such reasoning that are troubling. The
standards are highly susceptible to manipulation. The patient can create
the emergency by threatening a more horrible homemade suicide if
expert aid is not forthcoming. 185 The doctor can manipulate the deter-
mination that the patient's condition is hopeless by controlling the
information presented to consultants. The trial court reasoned that
Chabot should escape punishment because he had acted in an "emer-
gency situation" even though the consultants affirming his assessment
did not examine the patient. 186 Permitting assisted suicide without
examination of the patient by an independent medical consultant can
raise questions about the voluntariness of the request for aid and the
patient's competence to make it.
In the 1980s, Dutch jurisprudence had come to accept unbearable
psychological suffering as a justification of euthanasia upon request but
in a context in which the psychological fear was prompted by a serious
physical condition that threatened the loss of the patient's indepen-
dence.187 The depression suffered by Dr. Chabot's patient appears not
to have been rooted in such a serious physical malady and thus judging
the extent of the pain would be more subjective.
The Chabot case reached the pinnacle of the Dutch judicial system
when the High Court issued its ruling on June 21, 1994.188 The inter-
mediate tribunal, the Court of Appeal at Leeuwarden, had found Dr.
Chabot not guilty of deliberately aiding someone to commit suicide
since he had justifiably relied on the existence of a state of emergency,
but the High Court concluded that Chabot had performed acts punish-
able under Article 294 of the Netherlands Penal Code which makes it
illegal to incite, assist, or provide the means for the commission of
183. Id. at 235.
184. Id.
185. See HENDIN, supra note 130, at 132. Hendin states: "Suicidal patients commonly use the
threat of their death to coerce and control others, including the therapists .. . The psychology of 'if
you don't help me kill myself I will do it in a more violent and disturbing way' is a variation of this
theme." Id.
186. Kaufman, supra note 170, at 818-19.
187. See Abstracts, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 455, 455-64 (1988) (abstracting H.R.G. Feber, De weder-
waardigheden van artikel 293 van het Wetboek van Strafrecht vanat 1981 heden (The Vicissitudes of
Article 293 of the Penal Code from 1981 to the Present), in EUTHANASIE KNELPUNTEN IN EEN DIscUssE
(EUTHANASIA: BOrrLENECKS IN ADIStCUStON) 54-81 (G.A. Van Der Wal ed., 1987) prepared from a
translation and summary by Dr. Walter Lagerway). See also GOMEZ, supra note 37, at 34-9.
188. Opinion Chabot, supra note 8, at 893-95. For another interpretation and translation of this
case, see Griffiths, supra note 8.
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suicide by another.189 However, since mitigating circumstances were
present, the High Court concluded that no punishment should be
imposed.190
The Dutch High Court noted that a physician could be confronted
with an emergency when faced with the conflicting duties of preserving a
patient's life and alleviating unbearable suffering.191 Ms. Bosscher was
suffering from depression but was not psychotic. 192 The Attorney
General argued that since Ms. Bosscher was not terminally ill and was
not suffering physical pain, an emergency did not exist to justify Dr.
Chabot's aiding her suicide. 193 The High Court rejected these conten-
tions. The key to finding the existence of an emergency is the "unbear-
able" nature of the suffering and the lack of any prospect of recovery
and not whether pain is provoked by physical or psychological
causes. 194 The degree of suffering can be viewed in the abstract apart
from its cause. However, when the nature of the pain is alleged to be
psychological rather than somatic, a judge must make a careful
investigation as to whether the pain is genuine.' 95 In determining the
justifiability of the doctor's choices between the conflicting duties to
maintain life and relieve pain, the judge must evaluate the decision under
the established standards of medical science and ethics.196
The Attorney General also contended that when a patient is under
psychiatric care, there can be no voluntary ("free will") decision, and
even if the court should determine that it was possible for a psychiatric
patient to make a voluntary decision, one was not made in this case. 197
Finally, the Attorney General asserted that Chabot's failure to have the
patient examined by another psychiatrist precluded a finding of an
emergency.198 The High Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that a
person complaining of "psychic suffering" could be capable of making
a free will decision to seek death.199 However, the High Court found that
Chabot had erred in not having an examination of the patient made by
an independent doctor.200
189. Opinion Chabot, supra note 8.
190. Id.
191. Id.; see also Belian, supra note 181, at 291-93.
192. Opinion Chabot, supra note 8.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. Some writers argue that the Dutch judges' deference to the opinions of the medical
community is far too liberal, especially with respect to essentially subjective terms like "unbearable"
and "genuine." See Belian, supra note 181 at 275-78; Hendin, supra note 179, at 431-32.
197. Opinion Chabot, supra note 8.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. The requirement of second and third opinions is included in virtually every law allowing
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The High Court appeared to be reluctant to conclude that there
could never be a finding of emergency in the absence of such an
examination, but when the patient's suffering was psychological and
thus difficult to diagnose, an independent assessment normally is
essential. 201 Apparently Chabot's consultation with other doctors who
relied on his account of the patient's condition was not enough. The
patient must be "seen and examined" by the independent doctor.202
The examination should inquire into the severity of the suffering, the
prospect of recovery, and the patient's ability to make voluntary
decisions. 203 This last point must focus on whether or not the patient's
abilityl to make rational and voluntary decisions has been warped by her
psychological condition. 20 4 An emergency that justifies a doctor's aid-
ing a patient to commit suicide cannot be found if the patient voluntarily
has rejected alternate treatment that presented a realistic prospect of
alleviating the suffering.205
In the absence of a careful inquiry by an independent doctor who
has seen and examined the patient, the Court of Appeal should not have
found an emergency in the form of a conflict between the duties to
preserve life and relieve suffering and it should not have found that Dr.
Chabot was free from guilt in choosing to assist in the patient's
suicide. 20 6 However, even though the finding of an emergency was not
proper and the doctor could not be cleared completely of guilt, "the
personality of the accused [Chabot] and the circumstances under which
the proven act ha[d] been committed" convinced the High Court not to
impose a penalty. 207 In other words, the act was of the type punishable
under the law, but Chabot was not a person who should be punished
because, even though his actions were not free from fault, they were not
reprehensible.
In 1995, the Medical Disciplinary Tribunal issued a reprimand to
Chabot for conduct that "undermined confidence in the medical
profession." 208 The Tribunal agreed that assisting in a suicide could be
ethical, even if the patient's pain is not physical and she is not terminally
ill, but the request must be voluntary and the illness must not be
assisted suicide. See Belian, supra note 181, at 256-57; Magnusson, supra note 165 at 57-78
(discussing the "emerging jurisprudence" of assisted suicide and euthanasia).
201. Opinion Chabot, supra note 8.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. Despite the second opinion requirement, one writer asserts that Dutch doctors wishing to
assist suicides frequently consult euthanasia advocates in the medical community who specialize in
such grim second opinions. Hendin, supra note 179, at 431-32.
205. Opinion Chabot, supra note 8.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Griffiths, supra note 8, at 895.
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treatable.2 09 The Tribunal concluded that Chabot was not justified in
determining that Ms. Bosscher's condition was not susceptible to treat-
ment until he had attempted it and her refusal to accept treatment was a
reason for Chabot to reject her request for aid in committing suicide. 210
A vigorous debate is occurring over whether or not the indulgent
Dutch attitude toward those aiding another to commit suicide has low-
ered respect for the sanctity of life and tempted doctors to assume the
role of the final arbiter of life and death. In September 1991, the Dutch
Governmental Committee on Euthanasia issued a report that found that
1000 cases of "involuntary active euthanasia" defined as "'deliberate
action to terminate life without the patient's request"' took place
yearly. 211 However, Dr. Richard Fenigsen found that this figure signifi-
cantly underestimated the rate of euthanasia performed by physicians
without the patient's consent. 2 12 He concluded that 4,941 cases of death
listed under the benign label of "Pain Relief' deserved to be classified
as involuntary euthanasia since they involved the intentional giving of
"lethal overdoses of morphine without the patient's knowledge, with the
patient's death as the main or the only purpose." 213 To Fenigsen the
figures proved that "involuntary euthanasia is regularly practiced in the
country, not as sporadic punishable acts committed by some outcasts, but
as a justifiable part of common medical practice." 2 14 He noted that
"[t]he committee justifies the active involuntary euthanasia as a charita-
ble assistance in dying given in a situation of higher necessity." 2 15
Presumably such a standard of "higher necessity" goes beyond the
mere necessity relied upon by the High Court in the Chabot case to
support the assistance the doctor rendered to a patient who made clear
and persistent requests for such aid. Was a dimension of this finding of
"higher necessity" having a patient who was incompetent to make his or
her own decision, forcing the doctor to act alone? Not always! Fourteen
percent of the involuntary euthanasia patients were fully competent and
eleven percent were partially competent. 2 16
The report included the results of a survey of doctors who had
participated in active involuntary euthanasia. 2 17 They gave as reasons
209. Id. at 896.
210. Id.
211. Fenigsen, supra note 119, at 340. Questions are raised about the methodology used to reach
these high involuntary euthanasia figures in Ronald Dworkin, Assisted Suicide: What the Court Really
Said, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs, Sept. 25, 1997 at 44.
212. Fenigsen, supra note 119, at 339.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 341-42.
215. Id. at 342.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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for taking such a drastic step justifications such as "'[l]ow quality of
life,"' "'no prospect of improvement"' and the "'family could not
take it anymore."' 218 Such descriptions reflect very subjective reactions
to individual situations rather than a consistent standard of "higher
necessity." Fenigsen concludes that even though "so-called rules of
careful conduct (official guidelines . . .)" have been issued to govern
euthanasia, and these rules require that there be a request from the
patient, the standards often are ignored. 2 19
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court's opinion in Glucksberg
seized on such reports, especially the "more than 1,000 cases of eutha-
nasia without an explicit request," as evidence that a supposedly limited
right of assisted suicide could lead to a "much broader license, which
could prove extremely difficult to police and contain." 220 There is no
better evidence that a right of assisted suicide would defy efforts to
"contain" it than the Chabot case. The right could evolve from one
limited to the terminally ill patients suffering severe physical pain to
those who were not physically sick but suffering from depression. In
addition, safeguards, such as the requirement that other doctors be
consulted, could lead to bureaucratic squabbles over the subtle nuances
of the rules. A right fraught with such difficulties could inspire feelings
of anxiety rather than liberation among patients. In addition, patients
could begin to fear involuntary euthanasia.
Evidence that involuntary euthanasia is not an unusual occurrence
in the Netherlands is found in the regulations requiring treating physi-
cians to report to municipal coroners their participation in "active
termination of life without express request" as well as cases in which the
doctor's aid was solicited by the patient. 221 The physician is required to
report why the patient's life was terminated in the absence of an express
request, why there was no such request at the time of termination,
218. Id. at 343.
219. Id. See Dr. G. Steven Neeley, The Constitutional Right to Suicide, The Quality of Life, and
the "Slippery-Slope": An Explicit Reply to Lingering Concerns, 28 AKRON L. REV. 53, 73-4 (1994)
(cautioning against placing too much weight on the Dutch statistics). Neeley argues that because of
confusion of definitions of categories of euthanasia and difficulty in gauging the extent to which
political bias affected the results, "it is presently impossible to extrapolate any standard from the Dutch
experience that could realistically serve to bar recognition of the constitutional right to suicide within
the United States." Id. at 74.
220. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2273-74 (1997) (citing Physician Assisted
Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady to the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (Comm. Print
1996)).
221. See Attention Points for the Treating Physician in Connection with a Report to the Municipal
Coroner of a Death as a Result of a Request to Terminate Life, Assisting with Suicide or Active
Termination of Life Without Express Request Meant in Article 1, 688 Stb.(Staatsblad van het
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden) pt. 1II, at 3-5 (1993) (translation by Edward Kluiters, J.D.).
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whether there had been one earlier and whether the doctor had consulted
with the patient's next of kin, lawyer, and other physicians. 2 2 2
Surprisingly, the query is no more detailed and probing in the case of
termination of life without request than it is when the patient asked for
the doctor's aid.223
Involuntary euthanasia, in the sense of an act performed against the
will of a competent patient, obviously is not the policy of the Dutch
government. However, the number of instances reported above of
euthanasia performed by doctors on their own initiative without consult-
ing competent patients indicates that there may be an atmosphere of
tolerance of euthanasia that could lower the threshold of respect for life
that could set a precedent for more drastic measures. Lucy Dawidowicz
reminds us of the progression of Nazi euthanasia policy escalating from
killing "mentally deficient and deformed children" to killing so-called
"'racially valueless' children" to killing insane adults to killing the
"incurably sick" to the mass killing of Jews and other disfavored racial
and ethnic groups.224 Although there is a vast difference between the
mercy-oriented Dutch experience and the racial purity approach of the
Nazi abominations, the historical experience is bound to make many
people wary of any form of euthanasia.
In his book Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our
Traditional Ethics, Peter Singer offers a more positive interpretation of
the Dutch practice. 225 In his view there are few genuine cases of invol-
untary euthanasia in the sense of deliberately causing the death of
patients against their will. 226 Many cases are misnamed involuntary
euthanasia. 227 These are cases in which the doctor acts without the
explicit request of the patient but under circumstances in which the
patient was either incapable of making such a request but death was
assumed to be the wish of the incurably and painfully-ill patient who
already was near death, or cases in which the patient communicated with
the doctor in a manner that was not a specific request for euthanasia but
which reasonably could be interpreted as such a request. 228 Singer
prefers to label such cases as "non-voluntary" rather than "involuntary
euthanasia." 229 Such verbal refinement still does not obscure the fact
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Lucy DAWIDOWiCZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-45 172-73 (1975).
225. PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR TRADITIONAL ETHics
152-53 (1994).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 153.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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that doctors taking such action are not following the voluntary euthana-
sia guidelines of the Royal Dutch Medical Association which Singer
himself describes as requiring "an explicit request from the patient
which leaves no room for doubt about the patient's desire to die." 230
However, Singer argues that cases of doctors acting without such an
explicit request are not numerous and the Dutch practice more typically
involves wide consultation between the patient, doctor, nurses, religious
and other counselors, and the patient's family. 231 Thus, in Singer's view,
the Dutch do more openly, carefully, and compassionately what often is
done secretly and impetuously in other countries. 232 This allows for a
more peaceful death. 233
Herbert Hendin, M.D., is a psychiatrist and Director of the Ameri-
can Suicide Foundation. 234 Shortly after the lenient decision concerning
Dr. Chabot, he conducted interviews with physicians, prosecutors, de-
fense lawyers, and activists on both sides of the assisted suicide and
euthanasia controversy. 235 He reached conclusions sharply critical of the
Dutch practices. 236 He found that the system had expanded the power of
doctors rather than the freedom of patients. 2 37  He observed that
"[e]uthanasia, fought for on the basis of the principle of autonomy and
self-determination of patients has actually increased the paternalistic
power of the medical profession." 238 The legal system provides little
check on such power. He charged that:
"the Dutch judicial system in euthanasia cases presents a
ritualized drama that allows for some subtle, minor
improvisation before acquittal or admonishment. If our adver-
sarial judicial system could be said at times to sacrifice justice
on the altar of victory, in theirs the sacrifice seems to have been
for the sake of what the Dutch would regard as the higher goal
of social harmony." 239
Hendin viewed the Netherlands' system as affording too little
incentive to conduct therapy aimed at the underlying cause of
depression or a suicide wish. 240 It is too skewed toward letting patients
230. Id. at 146.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 132-42 (comparing cases in the United States, Australia, Canada, and Great
Britain with the death of a patient called "Carla" in the Netherlands).
234. Hendin, supra note 121, at 123.
235. Id. at 123-24.
236. See generally id. (criticizing the Dutch practices).
237. Id. at 163.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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and doctors act out mutually reinforcing fantasies as they form a bond
to control the dying process. 24 1 In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court
relied on Hendin's research to fortify its observation that treatment of
pain and depression would lead many patients to revoke requests for
assisted suicide.242
Professor John Griffiths of the University of Groningen criticizes
Hendin for distorting the Dutch practice. 24 3  He contends that the
life-ending activities of Dutch doctors consist largely of terminating
life-support systems and giving large doses of pain-relieving drugs to
those very close to death. 244 The Dutch are merely trying to bring under
public social control acts that are widely but covertly practiced
elsewhere. 245
Hendin's criticism of physicians too eager to aid in suicide was
mirrored in the Michigan Court of Appeals approval in 1995 of an
injunction prohibiting Dr. Jack Kevorkian from assisting others to
commit suicide. 246 The court emphasized that before helping Janet
Adkins, a patient who was suffering from the early stages of Alzheimer's
disease and who was not then terminally ill or in pain, to take her life,
Kevorkian conducted no physical or mental examination, compiled no
medical history, consulted no other doctor, dealt with a disorder beyond
his professional competence, "made no real effort to discover whether
Ms. Adkins wished to end her life," and "appeared to be in a hurry"
during his video taped interview with the patient. 247 Even though Dr.
Chabot apparently acted with more care and deliberation, concern that
the physician acted precipitously remains.
The fragile rationale supporting a right to assisted suicide or eutha-
nasia is weakened further when it is extended to cases such as Chabot in
which the patient is not in the final stages of a terminal illness. Robert
Wennberg has noted that recognition of a right of assisted suicide always
runs the risk of violating moral standards by ending a life before it has
241. Id. at 126-130, 137-39, 164.
242. Glucksberg v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2274 (1997) (citing an expanded, book version,
of the research: HERBERT HENDIN, M.D., SEDUCED BY DEATH: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND THE DUTCH
CURE (1997)).
243. Griffiths, supra note 8, at 247-48.
244. Id. at 247.
245. Id. at 247-48.
246. Michigan v. Kevorkian, 534 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) appeal denied, 549
N.W.2d 566 (1996), and cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 296 (Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 96-135). Despite the order,
Dr. Kevorkian continued to assist in suicides and he was consistently acquitted by criminal trial juries.
After being acquitted of violating the state's common law ban on aiding another to commit suicide
Kevorkian stated that nothing could stop him but being "burned at the stake." See 3 Kevorkian
Suicides in 10 Days, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 22, 1996, News 8n (North Sports Final Edition.) See also
Jack Lessenberry, Jury Acquits Kevorkian in Common-Law Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1995 at A 14.
247. Kevorkian, 534 N.W.2d at 174.
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served its purpose but the risk is reduced when the patient suffers "in-
tractable and agonizing pain," there is a condition that frustrates life's
plan, and the patient is in the "final stages of a terminal condition." 248
When the final phase of a terminal illness is not present, medical interven-
tion is more arrogant. 249 It does not accelerate a dying process already
well under way; it initiates that process. 250 In addition, although
Chabot's patient may have been suffering the "agonizing pain" of
depression, the evidence that this condition was intractable was weak.
The Royal Dutch Medical Association responded to some of the
criticism by revising its guidelines in a statement issued to doctors on
August 25, 1995.251 The revisions express a preference for assisted
suicide, in which the patient takes drugs prescribed by the doctor, over
voluntary euthanasia, in which the physician administers the treatment
causing death. 252 Dr. Robert Dillman, a member of the Medical Asso-
ciation's ethics committee said that "[tihis step is first a decision of the
patient, and eating or drinking the substance is a symbol of the patient's
responsibility." 253 The new guidelines emphasize that not only should
the primary physician consult another doctor before assisting in suicide
or performing euthanasia, but also the consulting physician must
examine the patient and be an independent decision maker without close
family or professional ties to the primary physician or the patient. 254
These revisions should reduce the chance of physicians acting with
god-like autonomy. 255
An especially troubling feature of the Chabot case is the pivotal
decision-making role that a severely depressed patient was allowed to
248. ROBERT N. WENNBERG, TERMINAL CHOICES: EUTHANASIA, SUICIDE, AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 107
(1989).
249. Id. at 92.
250. Id. at 91-2.
251. Marlise Simons, Dutch Doctors to Tighten Rules on Mercy Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1995, at A3.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. In 1990, an American state court took a dramatically different approach to that of the
Chabot case. In McKay v. Bergstedt, the Supreme Court of Nevada vindicated the right of a compe-
tent adult quadriplegic to direct disconnection of his respirator even though his death would result, but
it sharply distinguished the case from those in which there was a mental but no physical affliction.
McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 619 (Nev. 1990). The Nevada court noted that:
It is equally clear that if [the patient] had enjoyed sound physical health, but had viewed
life as unbearably miserable because of his mental state, his liberty interest would
provide no basis for asserting a right to terminate his life with or without the assistance of
other persons. Our societal regard for the value of an individual life, as reflected in our
Federal and State constitutions, would never countenance an assertion of liberty over life
under such circumstances.
Id. at 625.
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exercise. 256 This destroys the illusion of rationality, care, and delibera-
tion created by the Dutch guidelines. Yale medical professor Sherwin B.
Nuland in his book How We Die contends that "[n]o one with impaired
powers of judgment is in a position to make a critical decision about
ending his or her own life--on that point, there is no disagreement, even
among the ethicists who argue most persuasively for the concept that has
recently come to be known as 'rational suicide."' 257  Although
Nuland's arguments were made in 1994, they have ancient antecedents.
Epicurus, a Greek philosopher writing more than two centuries before
the birth of Christ, observed that a seriously depressed person could be
perversely attracted to suicide out of a fear of death. 258 Writing in 1637,
the British Puritan theologian John Sym noted that "so farre doth the
forerunners and feare of death prevaile with some, that the same makes
them to cast themselves headlong into that, which they would most
shun." 259 Whether such behavior is viewed as confrontation of or
surrender to one's greatest fear, it is not the rational course. Epicurus
contended that such a person should strive to banish his fear of death
rather than rush toward it.260
B. COMPLEX PROCEDURES IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
AND COLOMBIA
The complex procedures used in the Netherlands were rivaled by a
law passed by the Northern Territory of Australia in the summer of
1995.261 A terminally ill patient "experiencing pain, suffering and/or
distress to an extent unacceptable to the patient" could request medical
assistance in terminating his or her life.262 The use of the vague term
"distress" opened possibilities for manipulation and abuse. The
Australian law permitted doctors to administer as well as prescribe a
life-terminating drug. 2 63 The Northern Territory law required that there
be a second examining physician who had to be "a qualified
psychiatrist." 264 The independence of this doctor was ensured by the
requirements that he or she not be a relative of the patient, part of the
same medical practice as the first doctor, or one who would benefit
256. Opinion Chabot, supra note 8.
257. SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE: REFLECTIONS ON LIFE'S FINAL CHAPTER 157 (1995).
258. See John M. Cooper, Greek Philosophers on Euthanasia and Suicide, in SUICIDE AND
EUTHANASIA: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY THEMES 9, 29 (Baruch A. Brody ed., 1989).
259. JOHN SYM, L IFEs PRESERVATIVE AGAINST S ELF-KILLINO 213 (emphasis in original) (Michael
MacDonald ed., 1988) (1637).
260. See Cooper, supra note 258, at 29.
261. See Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, 1995 (N. Terr. Austl. Laws).
262. Id. at ch. 2 (4).
263. See id.
264. Id. at ch. 1 (3).
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financially from the patient's death.2 65 No request could be granted if
the doctors concluded that "palliative care" could alleviate the pain "to
levels acceptable to the patient" but this was a highly subjective standard
vulnerable to manipulation.266
The validity of the law was upheld by the Supreme Court of the
Territory in Wake and Gondarra v. Northern Territory of Australia.267
The plaintiffs charged that by creating a system under which a person
could commit doctor-aided suicide, the law encroached on the inalien-
able right to life.268 Without clearly deciding whether or not there was
such a right, the court concluded that under their constitutional system,
unlike that of countries with a written Bill of Rights, even a fundamental
or deeply-rooted right could be infringed if the legislature made it clear
that such was its intent. 269 The court also held that the Territorial Legis-
lature and Administrator did not exceed their powers under the national
Constitution. 270 The dissent filed by Justice Angel chided the majority
for considering suicide as a purely private issue that does not harm
others.271 He observed:
It is said that suicide is a private matter. It is not entirely
private. No man is an island. The death of a person affects
others, beneficiaries under a will or upon an intestacy, joint
property holders, the status of spouses, life insurers, persons in
business or commercial relations with the deceased, the State in
terms of taxation, and so on, to say nothing of the emotional
and moral feelings of relatives and friends occasioned by the
time and circumstances of death. There is no clear demarca-
tion between private and public law.272
This list of those affected by a person's death could also serve as a
list of potential challengers to the use of the procedure to hasten death.
Challengers could attack whether the patient is "experiencing pain,
suffering and/or distress," whether the second examining doctor is
qualified in psychiatric disorders and is truly independent, whether the
doctors stand to benefit financially from the death, and whether
sufficient efforts to use palliative care were made. Creating such a
labyrinth is not creating a meaningful right. Perhaps this contributed to
265. Id. at ch. 2 (7)(c), (m).
266. See id. at ch. 8 (1).
267. See Wake & Gondarra v. Northern Territory of Australia, No. 112 of 1996, (N. Terr. Austi.
S. Ct. July 24, 1996).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. (Angel, J., dissenting).
272. Id.
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the decision of the National Senate of Australian to override the
Northern Territory's law which had been implemented by using a
bizarre computerized system controlling the fatal injections.2 73
A similarly complex set of safeguards was proposed by the Consti-
tutional Court of Colombia when it held that doctors conducting eutha-
nasia at the request of terminally ill patients suffering severe pain should
not be subject to criminal penalties. 274 The court determined that,
although the state had a duty to protect life, it should be interpreted in a
manner consistent with human dignity and freedom of personality. 275
The fundamental right to live in dignity connoted a right to die with
dignity. 276 Forcing a terminally ill person to endure great pain just to
extend his or her life for a short time was cruel and inhumane. 277
Persons in that condition who had the ability to comprehend their
situations could request assistance in hastening death.2 78 But the court
held that such a request must be clearly and unequivocally made; it
should be made more than once with a reasonable period of time
between the first and last requests. 279 Prior to the last request, the patient
should attend a meeting with a support team that should explain his or
her condition and list alternatives to euthanasia, including palliative care.
The patient's consent to the euthanasia should be based on reliable
information about the illness, the prognosis, and treatment options. 280
The euthanasia should be carried out by a physician since the medical
profession is uniquely capable of both giving the reliable information
about the patient's condition and effectively performing the
euthanasia. 281 Care should be taken to ensure that the consent is genuine
and not the result of temporary depression. 282 These were the broad
outlines of regulations that would reconcile the values of respect for life
273. See Euthanasia Laws Act 1997, No. 17, 1997 (Austl). The collapse of the Northern Terri-
tory's euthanasia experiment was influential in persuading the Supreme Court in Glucksberg that the
international tide was flowing against legalization of assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2266-67 n. 16 (1997). Before revocation of the law, four people
had used its procedures to end their lives with the aid of "a computer controlled machine that injected
a lethal drug." See Euthanasia Law Struck Down in Australia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at A15.
274. Complaint of Josd Euripides Parra Parra, Sentencia No. C-239/97, (Corte Constitucional,
Mayo 20, 1997) (translations by Michael Mounter and Christina Jacuzzo on file with the author at the
University of South Carolina Law School, Columbia, South Carolina).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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and dignity of the patient. 283 However, the court called on the congress
to enact detailed regulations. 284
The decision was subjected to a barrage of criticism, including
statements by Catholic officials who complained that it exalted freedom
of personal decision making over sanctity of life. 285 Even those who
supported voluntary euthanasia were critical because of fear that the
right would be so closely restricted by government regulations as to be
meaningless. 286 One Bogota physician who advocated a right of eutha-
nasia said, "I am concerned that they will complicate things and
establish extremely strong controls." 287
The intricate web of safeguards accompanying assisted suicide in
the Netherlands, the aborted Northern Australian system, the Colombian
decision, as well as Dr. Quill's proposals, raise serious questions about
the genuineness of the "right" they accompany. The concluding
section of this article contends that a "right" hidebound by so many
restrictions would not increase privacy in personal decision making and
thus is not worth adopting given the risks of abuse (in the form of
pressuring the vulnerable to choose death) that would accompany a right
of assisted suicide. The confusion that would be created by convoluted
procedures might accomplish no more than weaving a mask behind
which pressure on the vulnerable would continue.
V. CONCLUSION: A PRIVACY RIGHT WITHOUT PRIVACY
At the close of its Glucksberg opinion, the Supreme Court noted
that "throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and
profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of
physician-assisted suicide." 288 Even though the Court found no consti-
tutional right to engage in that practice, it observed that the debate could
"continue, as it should, in a democratic society." 289 This leaves open a
possibility that state legislative actions, constitutional initiatives, court
decisions based on state constitutional rights, or even federal court
decisions, dealing with markedly different facts than Glucksberg and
Vacco, could approve some form of a right of assisted suicide. The
adoption of such a right would be a serious mistake since it would be
self-contradictory: a right based on principles of privacy but girded with
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See Serge F. Kovaleski, Colombia Debates Court Ruling that Legalizes Mercy Killing, WASH.
POST, August 18, 1997, at A 15.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997).
289. Id.
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prolix safeguards against abuse that would often frustrate attempts to
exercise it privately. It would be a right beset with brakes to impede its
exercise.
Such brakes are found in the elaborate restrictions included in the
assisted suicide systems discussed above. Although the systems vary,
they frequently contain most of the following safeguards:
(1) The restrictions may contain regulations designed to
ensure the voluntariness of the patient's request for aid in
hastening death. They may include features such as
requirements that the request be repeated over a period of
time, made in writing, and attested by independent
witnesses.
(2) With the glaring exception of the Chabot case, the systems
generally require that the patient be suffering from a
terminal physical illness and in severe pain that cannot be
alleviated by palliative care.
(3) The patient must be mature, mentally competent, and not
suffering from depression that distorts his or her
judgment.
(4) The patient's terminal status, mental competence, and the
inability of pain relief to alleviate the suffering, must be
attested to by more than one doctor. Additional
requirements may be imposed to guarantee the
independence and expert qualifications of the consulting
doctors, and to ensure that the doctors and witnesses do
not stand to gain by the patient's death.
(5) Record keeping and reporting requirements may be
imposed to ensure that the above standards are met. 290
290. Recent evidence of the attitude that a right of assisted suicide should be carefully regulated
is seen in the resolution adopted by the American Bar Association at its August 1997 annual meeting.
The ABA did not take a stand on whether or not a right of assisted suicide should be adopted. This
was a matter for the state legislatures to resolve. See Bar Assn. Takes No Position on Doctor-Assisted
Suicide, L.A. TIMES, August 7, 1997, at A22. However, the resolution argued that in the event that any
state or territory chooses to adopt legislation permitting physician-assisted suicide, it "should ensure
that information and reporting systems are established to achieve close monitoring of the impact of
such practices, especially with respect to vulnerable populations who may be particularly at risk if
such practices are authorized." The full text of the resolution can be found on the ABA's intemet
annual meeting home page. See 102A American Bar Association Commission on Legal Problems of the
Elderly Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law Report to the House of Delegates
Recommendations, (visited Sept. 10, 1997) <http://www.abanet.orglannual/97/recommend/l02A.
html>. See also Paul Elias, ABA 's Suicide Resolution Resolves Very Little, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
Aug. 11, 1997.
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Bureaucratic controversies and litigation could develop over the
sufficiency of these guidelines to protect against abuse, and over whether
the requirements have been met in a particular case. For example,
opposing medical experts could battle over whether or not the patient is
terminal, is competent, and whether palliative care could resolve the
situation, thus obviating the need to hasten death. Probably some
official or board would be designated to resolve the controversy. It is
likely that the decision of such officials would be challenged in court
actions involving such issues as whether the decision was supported by
adequate facts and whether the Due Process Clause standards for notice
and hearing were observed. A less private procedure could not be
imagined. The ultimate decision could be made by strangers.
Even a system replete with many of the above safeguards has been
challenged as not rigorous enough. There has been a prolonged squab-
ble involving the assisted suicide right adopted by initiative in Oregon in
1994.291 Implementation of the measure was enjoined on the grounds
that the complex safeguards were still not adequate under equal protec-
tion standards to safeguard the terminally ill from being pressured or
coerced into choosing assisted suicide.2 92  The law did not require that
independent consulting physicians confirm that the patient was compe-
tent and making a voluntary request. 2 9 3  The measure only required
doctors to act in "good faith" rather than to use "the ordinary level of
skill expected by the medical profession" which was the higher standard
applied to most medical procedures in the state. 294 The court concluded
that there should be "independent oversight of the decision" such as
291. See Measure 16, Death With Dignity Act, adopted Nov. 8, 1994 and codified as OR. REV.
STAT. § 127.800 -127.995 (1995).
292. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1421, 1429, 1439 (D. Or. 1995) (dealing with standing and
other jurisdictional issues, finding an equal protection violation, and granting declaratory and
injunctive relief against Measure 16), vacated and remanded, Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (1997)
(holding the plaintiffs lacked standing); cert. denied sub noma., Lee v. Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328
(1997). One commentator notes that the Supreme Court's refusal to review the case leaves in effect
the Court of Appeals' decision that the plaintiffs attacking the law lacked standing. See Linda
Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup; Assisted Suicide Clears a Hurdle in Highest Court, N.Y. TiMEs,
Oct. 15, 1997, at Al. This may open the way to implement the law.
On November 4, 1997, Oregon voters defeated an attempt to repeal the assisted suicide
initiative adopted in 1994. See Timothy Egan, Right to Die in Oregon, Opening a New Front in the
World of Medicine, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 6, 1997, at A22. The Supreme Court's denial of review and the
new Oregon vote are consistent with the Court's observation in Washington v. Glucksberg that its
"holding permits the debate to continue as it should in a democratic society." Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997). Despite the actions that seemed to clear the way for
implementation of the Oregon Provisions, yet another bureaucratic hurdle has been added to
complicate the exercise of the "right." The Director of the Drug Enforcement Administration, a
federal agency, has threatened to revoke the prescription-writing authority of any doctor who
participates in an assisted suicide. See Oregon Doctors Fear Threat from DEA on Prescriptions, STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Nov. 12, 1997, at A7.
293. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1435.
294. Id. at 1436.
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that which could be provided by "medical professionals" or a "probate
court" in a manner similar to that of civil commitment proceedings. 295
Ultimately the decision was vacated because the plaintiffs lacked
standing. 296
But whether or not the district judge's ruling remains in force is not
the point. The point is that a right of assisted suicide or euthanasia
seems destined to be accompanied by elaborate safeguards that defeat its
purposes of affording death with dignity, vindicating private autonomy
and avoiding pain-wracked final days. What could be less dignified than
such wrangling? Presumably pain would continue while the convoluted
procedure is followed, or it would be alleviated by means not dependent
upon such a right.
A right of assisted suicide would be susceptible to abuse. Vulner-
able groups such as the elderly and disabled could be pressured to
exercise it. Cost-cutting enthusiasm might seize upon such a right as a
cheaper means of treatment. Involuntary euthanasia could be practiced.
Thus elaborate safeguards are probably necessary if there is to be such a
right. But once this is admitted, the right loses its meaning as individual
autonomy and personal dignity are replaced by a bureaucratization of
death.
295. Id.
296. Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. deniedsub nom. Lee v. Harcleroad, 118
S. Ct. 328 (1997).
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